Muslims in the EU:

Cities Report

THE NETHERLANDS

Preliminary research report and literature survey

2007
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# Table of contents

**Background** ........................................................................................................................................... 5

**Executive Summary** ............................................................................................................................... 6

**Part I: Research and literature on Muslims** ............................................................................................ 9

1. Population ............................................................................................................................................... 9
   1.1 A note on the terminology and statistics ......................................................................................... 9
   1.2 Patterns of immigration .................................................................................................................. 10
   1.3 Citizenship ........................................................................................................................................ 13

2. Identity and religiosity ............................................................................................................................ 14
   2.1 Religiosity .......................................................................................................................................... 14
   2.2 Radicalisation of Muslim young people ......................................................................................... 15
   2.3 Indicators on “happiness” ................................................................................................................ 16

3. Education ............................................................................................................................................. 18
   3.1 Educational achievement level ...................................................................................................... 18
   3.2 Experiences of discrimination in the educational system ............................................................... 19
   3.3 Islamic education and Muslim faith-based schools ...................................................................... 20

4. Employment ......................................................................................................................................... 22
   4.1 Employment and unemployment levels ......................................................................................... 22
   4.2 Discrimination in the labour market ............................................................................................. 23

5. Housing ................................................................................................................................................ 24
   5.1 Patterns of settlement ...................................................................................................................... 24
   5.2 Interaction between immigrants and native Dutch ........................................................................ 24

6. Health and social protection ................................................................................................................ 26
   6.1 Health situation of immigrants ....................................................................................................... 26
   6.2 Care for the elderly .......................................................................................................................... 26

7. Policing and security .............................................................................................................................. 28
   7.1 Representation of people with an immigrant background in the police force .............................. 28
   7.2 Criminality and victims of crime ..................................................................................................... 29
   7.3 Prisons ............................................................................................................................................... 29

8. Discrimination and anti-Muslim discourse and mobilisation ............................................................... 30
   8.1 Discrimination .................................................................................................................................. 30

9. Participation and citizenship .................................................................................................................. 33
   9.1 Political participation ....................................................................................................................... 33
   9.2 Civil society .................................................................................................................................... 34
   9.3 Attitudes of the public authorities towards Muslim organisations and institutions .................. 36

**Part II: Policy Context** ............................................................................................................................ 38

1. Perception of Muslims ........................................................................................................................... 38
   1.1 Inter-ethnic relations ....................................................................................................................... 38
   1.2 Political debate ............................................................................................................................... 39

2. Integration policy and governance of diversity .................................................................................... 42
   2.1 Governance of religious diversity and State–Church relations in The Netherlands ...................... 42
   2.2 Immigrant integration policies ....................................................................................................... 43

3. Administrative structures ....................................................................................................................... 47
   3.1 The local authorities ....................................................................................................................... 47

**Part III: City Selection** ............................................................................................................................ 51
1. **Amsterdam** ...................................................................................................................... 51
   1.1 Population and Islamic organisations and institutions ................................................. 51
   1.2 Policies concerning the Muslim population ................................................................. 51
   1.3 Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 53
2. **Rotterdam** ....................................................................................................................... 55
   2.1 Population and Islamic organisations and institutions ................................................. 55
   2.2 Policies concerning the Muslim population ................................................................. 55
   2.3 Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 57
3. **Utrecht and Zaanstad** .................................................................................................... 59
   3.1 Utrecht ........................................................................................................................ 59
   3.2 Zaanstad ...................................................................................................................... 60
List of tables

Table 1: Ethnic breakdown of the Muslim population (*allochtonen*)

List of acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (<em>Central Statistical Agency</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGB</td>
<td>Equal Treatment Commission (<em>Commissie Gelijke Behandeling</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christian-Democratic Appeal (<em>Christen-Democratisch Appel</em>) Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Democrats ’66 (<em>Democraten ’66</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Amsterdam Municipality (<em>Gemeente Amsterdam</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Green Left Party (<em>Groen Links</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Rotterdam Municipality (<em>Gemeente Rotterdam</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GU</td>
<td>Utrecht Municipality (<em>Gemeente Utrecht</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBR</td>
<td>The National Bureau against Racial Discrimination (<em>Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van rassendiscriminatie</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Labour Party (<em>Partij van de Arbeid</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialist Party (<em>Socialistische Partij</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (<em>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</em>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Background

This research paper, focusing on the situation of Muslims in the Netherlands, was commissioned by the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP)\(^1\), of the Open Society Institute (OSI).\(^2\) Similar reports have also been prepared for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK.

The overall aim of this series of research papers is to provide a comprehensive review of available research and literature on Muslims in each of these countries, including a bibliography covering the most relevant recent publications. Another aim is to facilitate the selection of a number of EU cities for inclusion in a proposed new OSI monitoring project to be initiated in 2007 — “Muslims in the EU: Cities Reports”. This project will address policy on Muslims at the city, or municipal, level, as opposed to the national level, which is the more usual level of analysis for cross-country monitoring. It follows on from previous EUMAP reports addressing the situation of Muslims in Europe, in particular the 2004 report *Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens*.\(^3\)

Each of the research reports follow the same methodology, to provide comparative information across the countries covered, according to a common methodology prepared by EUMAP.\(^4\) Part I of the report evaluates the availability of data and other information on the situation of — specifically — Muslims in the Netherlands, in the following areas: population, identity, education, employment, health and social protection, policing and security, and participation and citizenship. The Netherlands report also includes two additional sections, on discrimination and anti-Muslim sentiment and on radicalisation among young Muslims — which has become a particularly important theme in the Netherlands since the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Part II addresses the policy context in the Netherlands, in particular with regard to the perception of Muslims, integration policy and administrative structures. Part III looks more specifically at the potential suitability of four cities in the Netherlands with significant Muslim populations for inclusion in the OSI “Muslims in the EU” city monitoring project — Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Zaanstad.

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\(^1\) Full details on the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP) can be found at www.eumap.org.
\(^2\) Full details on the Open Society Institute (OSI) can be found at www.soros.org.
\(^3\) The full report, as well as previous EUMAP reports on the situation of Muslims in France and Italy, can be found here: http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/britishmuslims
\(^4\) The methodology for the research papers is available on the EUMAP website (www.eumap.org)
Executive Summary

In the Netherlands there are approximately 1 million Muslims, representing 5.8 per cent of the total population. The largest groups are people with origins in Morocco or Turkey, who make up over 75 per cent of the Muslim population. Immigration from these countries started with the arrival of labour migrants in the 1960s and 1970s, but numbers subsequently increased through family reunifications. Other important groups are the Surinamese Muslims and, particularly from the 1990s, refugees and asylum seekers mainly from Bosnia, Somalia, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Official Dutch statistics do not include data on religious affiliation. However, there are official data on ‘immigrants’ — *allochtonen* (literally ‘non-natives’), people who have at least one parent who was born abroad, and who may or may not have Dutch citizenship — and this is the main source of data in this report. It should be noted, therefore, that in this report terms such as ‘Turks’ or ‘Moroccans’ refer to people who have origins in these countries, and not exclusively to those who have Turkish or Moroccan nationality.

Most Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands are first- or second-generation immigrants, and over half have Dutch citizenship. There is a marked difference in how the first and second generations perceive their religious identities. The first generation retains strong links to their national identity, while the second generation is more likely to view their shared religion, Islam, as being of more importance than a shared origin and language.

Non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are traditionally concentrated in the four major cities — Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague — where they make up an overall 30 per cent of the population. They tend to be concentrated in segregated neighbourhoods, which suffer from problems of deterioration and high levels of crime.

The concentration of underprivileged immigrants is likely to be exacerbated in future, as the native Dutch — and increasingly also the immigrant — middle-class population move out to the city suburbs. This phenomenon is expected to have significant effects on the school population and the labour markets in those cities. In particular, it will mean that there will be even less interaction between the non-Western immigrants and the native Dutch. Already today, 70 per cent of the Turks and 60 per cent of the Moroccans associate predominantly with members of their own ethnic group, while two thirds of the native population have little or no contact at all with immigrants.

The educational attainment levels of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are significantly lower than for native Dutch. Turkish and Moroccan students are more likely to drop out of school and are overrepresented in the less academic strands of secondary education. However, the second generation is better educated than the first generation, and in the last 15 years, the average educational level of non-Western immigrants has increased faster than that of the native Dutch. There is some evidence of discrimination within the educational system, with issues relating to dress codes and the wearing of the *hijab* (headscarf) proving particularly controversial. Muslim denominational schools are financed by the Government, and in 2006 there were 46 Muslim primary schools and two Muslim secondary schools.

The lower educational attainment levels of immigrants in turn impacts on their employment situation. The labour market position of Muslims is precarious, with just one third of
Moroccans and half of Turks having a salaried job. Unlike the Moroccans, the Turks are more likely to be self-employed and to have their own businesses. The average household incomes of Moroccans and Turks are more than one third lower than for the native Dutch. Their unemployment rates are also elevated: 27 per cent for Moroccans and 21 per cent for Turks, as compared to 9 per cent for the native Dutch. However, a middle class is beginning to emerge. There is evidence of a move towards higher level jobs in the younger generation, due mainly to their higher educational levels.

Studies have revealed both direct and indirect discrimination in the labour market. In the selection process, for example, many companies use subjective criteria regarding the personality or attitude of the candidate, which can be disadvantageous for non-Western immigrants. There are also differences in the way in which non-Western immigrants and the native Dutch seek employment. Non-Western immigrants often look for work within their own ethnic group, using a network of family members, friends or relations, which channels them into lower paid employment. Employers also prefer to use their own informal channels to recruit. With respect to Muslims specifically, it seems that, in the workplace, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims have become more complex since 11 September. Complaints focus on reduced tolerance towards the wearing of the hijab, prayer opportunities, or of Muslims in general.

There is only limited information on the health situation of Muslims, specifically. However, it seems that their poorer socio-economic status does have an impact. The Turkish and Moroccan elderly are often in a worse health situation than the native Dutch elderly. Lifestyle factors can also play a role; for example, there is a particularly high mortality risk among adult Turkish males, who suffer from an elevated risk of cardiovascular diseases and lung cancer.

The Netherlands has extensive legislation to combat discrimination and racism. However, there has been growing concern about acts of violence targeting Muslims. Following September 11, there was an increase in the number of reported incidents, including vandalism and acts of aggression against Muslims and Islamic symbols. There were also a number of violent incidents after the assassination of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. The most dramatic incident of anti-Muslim violence the destruction by fire of a Muslim primary school in Uden in December 2004, which led Dutch politicians to publicly speak out against the attacks against Muslims.

There is only limited information on the experiences of Muslims in relation to criminal justice and policing. Despite targeted recruitment policies, the number of police officers with an immigrant background remains low, and police officers from an immigrant background report encountering a discriminatory atmosphere at work. Even in the major cities, employees with an immigrant background make up only around 6 per cent police staff. By contrast, at the other end of the judicial system, the situation is completely different, with non-natives overrepresented in the crime statistics. Although statistics on Muslims and criminality are not available, it is known that Turks and Moroccans are disproportionately registered by the police as suspects of a crime. In the prisons, one third of all prisoners are non-Western immigrants, while 20 per cent describe themselves as Muslim.

Following the 2003 elections, the Lower House of Parliament has at least ten members from Muslim backgrounds (out of 150 members). Levels of political participation vary among the Muslim communities. While the turnout of Turks at local elections is equal to, or even larger
than, that of the native Dutch, Moroccans have a smaller turnout than the native Dutch. Turks also have more confidence in political institutions than Moroccans. This is thought to reflect the fact that Turks have more social capital than other ethnic communities, which tends to encourage political participation and political trust. In comparison to Moroccans, Turks have more organisations and the networks between these organisations are closer.

Muslim organisations have succeeded in becoming among the most important organisations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. In the Netherlands, Muslim organisations were initially mainly mosque organisations that tried to meet the basic needs of Muslim immigrants, such as for prayer rooms, religious leaders and teahouses. However, from the 1980s the mosque organisations broadened their activities and subsequently achieved a strong presence in civil society. This was thanks to the existing legislation and the protection of freedom of religion, as well as the right to claim municipal subsidies. From the early 1980s, a number of important measures were taken to allow for Islamic practice and rituals, including with respect to ritual slaughtering, the call to prayer, the recognition of Muslim festivals and dietary rules (notably in the armed services and prisons), and the adjustment of legislation on funerary practices to allow for Islamic traditions.

The Dutch authorities have long shown an interest in developing and maintaining good relations with Muslim organisations. Consultations with representatives of Muslim organisations offer the opportunity to establish the main issues of concern and to reach agreement on policy proposals by means of deliberation and dialogue, particularly with respect to integration policy and the fight against radicalism. As in other countries, official policy has been to encourage Muslim organisations to form representative organisations or coordinating bodies, with approachable spokesmen. However, Muslim communities in the Netherlands do not form a coherent community, and remain splintered along ethnic and religious lines. This has made it difficult for these organisations to increase their political legitimacy.

Discussions about the integration into Dutch society of immigrants in general, and of Muslims specifically, have become much more heated in recent years. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a significant section of the Dutch population has had a negative opinion about the presence of immigrants. In general, opinions about the multi-ethnic society have become more negative — and particularly opinions about Muslims. The 2004 murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh focused public and media attention on the question of the radicalisation of young Dutch Muslims. Previously, policy makers had assumed that young Muslims would become more secular, and would look for less traditional forms of Islamic religiosity and practice than those of their parents. However, this perception has now changed dramatically.

The political discourse concerning Islam has also become sharper in recent years. A number of right-wing national politicians (including Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders) as well as local politicians (notably in Rotterdam) have become very visible in the Dutch media because of their statements on Islam. There has also been a change in national policy on integration. From 2000 on, there has been much discussion on the supposed failures of Dutch integration policies. The levels of socio-economic, geographical and cultural segregation in Dutch cities have been assessed by some as being far deeper than anyone dared to say. Between 2002 and 2006, successive governments have pushed for more restrictive policies towards immigration and has also developed several policies have to make integration of newcomers more mandatory and demanding, also in the domain of culture.
PART I: RESEARCH AND LITERATURE ON MUSLIMS

1. Population
The Muslim population in the Netherlands is approaching 900,000, or 5.8 per cent of the total population. The Western European average is around 3 per cent, with only France having a higher percentage of Muslims in the population, 6.8 per cent (see Douwes et al., 2005). However, as in most other European countries, this number should be taken with some caution, because statistics are usually based on ethnic descent, they do not take into account differences in Muslim identity, belief, practice and respect for the various religious duties.

1.1 A note on the terminology and statistics
This report describes the situation of ‘Muslims’ in the Netherlands, although in fact there are very few (if any) statistics on the ‘Muslim population’. Official statistics and census data of the population of the Netherlands do not include separate sections on religious groups. Therefore there are no data on the situation of ‘Muslims’ in the housing market or on the levels of unemployment among ‘Muslims’. Statistical data does cover the situation of ethnic minorities, and ethnicity and nationality are included in official statistics.

The Dutch statistical and analytical literature refers to ‘immigrants’ and their offspring with the terms ‘ethnic minorities’ and allochtonen. The latter term cannot be literally translated into English, but it means ‘non-natives’ as opposed to native Dutch (autochtonen). Persons who have at least one parent who was born abroad are considered allochtonen by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Statistical Agency, CBS), while people who have both parents born in the Netherlands are autochtonen. This also means that the category allochtonen includes both Dutch nationals and foreign nationals.

In the literature and statistics a further distinction is made between persons born abroad (first generation) and persons born in the Netherlands (second generation). Persons with an immigrant background are classified in official statistics (such as those of the CBS) as Western or non-Western, depending on their country of birth. The category ‘non-Western’ includes persons from Turkey, as well as countries in Africa, South America and Asia — with the exception of Indonesia and Japan. The reason for including immigrants from the latter two countries in the category of ‘Western countries’ is because of their socio-economic and socio-cultural position in Dutch society. They include immigrants from the Dutch East Indies and employees of Japanese companies in the Netherlands and their families (Nieuwboer, 2003).

Statistics also distinguish foreign nationals, referred to as aliens (vreemdelingen), a category that may include people with refugee status, with a temporary residency permit or with a permanent residency permit. Usually this distinction is used in statistics for purposes other

5 A recent article speaks of 920,000 Muslims in the Netherlands (Driessen and Merry, 2006: 201)
6 Statistics Netherlands (CBS) is responsible for collecting, processing and publishing statistics to be used in practice, by policymakers and for scientific research. On 3 January 2004, Statistics Netherlands became an autonomous agency with legal personality. There is no longer a hierarchical relationship between the Minister of Economic Affairs and the organisation. However, the Minister is responsible for setting up and maintaining a system for the provision of government statistical information; in other words the Minister is politically responsible for legislation and budget, for the creation of conditions for an independent and public production of high quality and reliable statistics. The costs of tasks and activities undertaken to put this legislation into practice are accountable to the Government’s budget. Further details available on the CBS website (www.cbs.nl).
than those relating to socio-economic position of groups in Dutch society, for example by governmental services such as the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND).

In sum, quite detailed statistical information on different ethnic minorities or different categories of *allochtonen* exists in the Netherlands. Those categories may include foreign-nationals as well as first- or second-generation ‘immigrants’ (with or without Dutch nationality).

The three largest non-Western population groups are the ‘Turks’, ‘Surinamese’ and ‘Moroccans’ (SCP, 2005). The ‘Turkish’ and ‘Moroccan’ inhabitants are predominantly Muslim (95 per cent and 97 per cent respectively). In this report, the situation of ‘Turks’ and ‘Moroccans’ is used as a proxy for ‘Muslims in the Netherlands’. This is a reasonable indication of the situation of Muslims. There is also statistical information on the situation of other groups of non-Western *allochtonen* which include important numbers of ‘Muslims’ (such as the people from the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia). Since the introduction of the new Constitution in 1983, which confirmed the separation of State and Church, the State does not keep statistics on religion. The CBS uses statistics on the number of immigrants from countries in which Islam is the dominant religion as a proxy for the number of Muslims.

When no specific data are available on the Turkish and Moroccan population groups, data on all non-Western immigrants are used in the report.

First, it should be emphasised that the statistics based on ethnicity, which are used as estimates of the situation of ‘Muslims’, do not reflect the level of religiosity or religious practice, or the different kind and degree of self-identification as ‘Muslim’ of immigrants and their offspring.

Second, it should be noted that terms such as ‘Turks’ and ‘Moroccans’ are used in policy discourse, in statistical data and in Dutch public discourse to refer to perceived ethnic groups, and not exclusively for people who have Turkish or Moroccan nationality. The term ‘Turk’ is also used to include Kurds, who are hardly referred to as a separate group in public discourse. As such, these terms may refer to people with Turkish or Moroccan nationality, to immigrants with Dutch citizenship or with dual citizenship (Dutch and Turkish or Moroccan), and to people who are born and raised in the Netherlands (who at least have one parent who is born abroad) and who can also have Turkish/Moroccan, dual or only Dutch nationality. Therefore in this report also, terms such as ‘Turks’ or ‘Moroccans’ are also used to refer to people who belong to these ethnic groups and not exclusively to speak of those who have Turkish or Moroccan nationality.

1.2 Patterns of immigration

The Muslim population in the Netherlands consists primarily of immigrants and their offspring, although there are a small number of converts. The largest groups are immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin, the result of a chain of migration, which began with the recruitment of labour migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. During this period the Dutch Government concluded recruitment agreements with several Southern European countries, and with Turkey and Morocco. The numbers of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims increased

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7 For an overview of immigration and integration patterns, see Penninx and Vermeulen (eds) (2000); and Lucassen and Penninx (1997).
rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s due to family reunification and family formation (i.e. marriages with partners from Turkey or Morocco).

Even before the Second World War, there were small pockets of Muslims, for instance in the cities of The Hague or Leiden. Most were students coming from colonial territories such as Indonesia. The proportion of the Muslim population in the Netherlands who originate from former colonial territories is relatively small compared to the situation in other former colonial powers such as France or the United Kingdom. It consists of a small community of Moluccan Muslims (families who arrived in the 1950s) and a larger number of Surinamese, who arrived before and after the independence of Surinam in 1975. Finally, there is a substantial Muslim population of different ethnic origin, who have often arrived as political refugees and as asylum seekers, predominantly since the 1990s, notably from Bosnia, Somalia, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The breakdown of the Muslim population is as shown below, in Table 1. This table is based (besides the number of converts) on the numbers of allochtonen. For the Surinamese, of the total number of 320,000 (CBS, 2005) the estimate is that 70,000 are Muslims. For the other groups of allochtonen included in the below table, the number of Muslims is equated to the total number of these groups.

Table 1. Ethnic breakdown of the Muslim population (allochtonen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Share of total Muslim population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>358,000</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch converts</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>885,000</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Douwes (2005: 27); also Phalet and Ter Wal (eds) (2004), 5 volumes.

Given the high proportion of Turks and Moroccans in the Muslim population, the focus in this report is on these groups. The first generations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants have been in the Netherlands since the early 1960s. Due to the nature and pattern of migration, men

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8 Besides an infinitely small number of Muslim students, a small community of Indonesian immigrants who belong to the Ahmadiyya movement and the small number of Moluccan Muslim families, there was no Muslim presence in the Netherlands before the 1960s. See: Landman (1992); and Roose (2005). For a history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands see: van Amersfoort (2004); Smeets and Veenman (2000); Smeets and Steijlen (2006).

9 For information on patterns of institutionalisation of Surinamese Muslims, see: Landman (1992); Bal & Sinha-Kerkhoff (2005).

10 Please note: if combined with the results of a more recent survey on the degree of self-definition as ‘belonging to a religion’ (included in CBS 2005: 120, Table 7.8), the numbers of Muslims with an Iraqi, Afghan, Iranian and Somali ethnic background should be taken with caution. According to this survey, 81 per cent of the Iraqis (aged 15-65) say they belong to a religion, 86 per cent of the Afghans, 46 per cent (!) of the Iranians and 93 per cent of the Somalis. This implies that the numbers of ‘Muslims’ given here for these groups (being the total number of people belonging to these groups) is probably too high.
from these groups have, on average, been in the Netherlands longer than women. The Turkish and Moroccan immigration was mainly composed of male labour migrants, and migration as a result of family reunification started later (mainly in the 1980s and 1990s). The Turkish and Moroccan second-generation population has grown rapidly in recent years. The third-generation population is still small, but growing rapidly. There were only 700 Moroccans and over 1,300 Turks of the third generation in 2000 (SCP, 2005).11

The age distribution of non-Western groups reveals important differences when compared with the native Dutch population. In most cases, these groups are considerably younger. In 2003, 40 per cent of the non-Western population were below 20 years of age. This proportion is almost twice as large as that of native Dutch people. The proportion of second-generation members of the non-Western population below 20 years of age was, at 80 per cent, even greater (Nieuwboer, 2003).

In 2003, 80–90 per cent of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants arrived with the purpose of family formation or family reunification (SCP, 2005).12 (Only spouses and dependent children are allowed to enter the country, under a family reunion scheme that has become increasingly stricter). However, since 1996 the number of persons who have immigrated for purposes of family reunification has gradually decreased. In 2000 this number still surpassed the number of persons arriving for family formation, but by 2006 there were 1.5 times more ‘family formation immigrants’ than ‘family reunification immigrants’ (SCP, 2005).13

11 The Netherlands Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) is a Government agency that conducts research into the social aspects of all areas of Government policy. The main fields studied are health, welfare, social security, the labour market and education, with a particular focus on the interfaces between them. The SCP’s reports are widely used by the Government, civil servants, local authorities and academics. Further information is available on the SCP website at: http://www.scp.nl

12 On the website of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service the following information is mentioned concerning the legislation on family reunification and family formation:

“For new rules with regard to family reunion and family formation: Taking effect on 1 November 2004, a number of things have changed in policy on family reunion and family formation. These changes are based on the current Cabinet’s Outline Agreement, the Dutch Work and Benefit Act (Wet werk en bijstand) and an EU Directive in respect of family reunion. With regard to these changes, it is important to distinguish between family reunion and family formation. We use the term family formation when a foreign national wants to obtain a residence permit to live in the Netherlands with a partner (either as a spouse, registered civil partner or cohabitant), with whom the relationship developed while the partner was residing in the Netherlands. When a foreign national wants to obtain a residence permit to live in the Netherlands with a family member (for example a child that wants to live with its parent), we call it family reunion. The Minister has decided on the following measures:

- The minimum age for family formation (not: family reunion) is increased from 18 to 21. If a foreign national wants to be eligible for family formation (not: family reunion), the standard amount to be earned by the wage earner will be increased from 100 per cent of the applicable standard under the Dutch Work and Benefit Act to 120 per cent of the minimum wage under the Dutch Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act (Wet minimumloon en minimum vakantiebijslag) including holiday allowance. This means the following amounts: €1,382.18 including holiday allowance or €1318.60 excluding holiday allowance per month;
- Moreover, single parents who are responsible for a child younger than 5 and persons aged 57.5 or more shall no longer be exempt from the requirement to have sufficient income for the purpose of family reunion and family formation. Persons who are permanently and completely unfit for work, persons aged 65 or over and persons who are permanently exempt from the obligation to apply for jobs will continue to be exempt from the requirement to have sufficient income.” See website of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, available at: http://www.ind.nl/en/inbedrijf/actueel/Nieuweregelsgezinsherenigingengezinsvorming.asp (accessed 25 November 2006).

13 This concerns the aggregate of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia (SCP, 2005: 21).
1.3 Citizenship

Since 1953, the Netherlands has known the principle of double *ius soli*, according to which people born in the national territory from parents who were themselves born in the national territory automatically gain Dutch citizenship (Jacobs & Rea, 2006). The principle of *ius soli* was strengthened in 1984 when the opportunity was given to the second generation of immigrants to acquire Dutch nationality through a simple declaration.¹⁴ Every foreigner between 18 and 25 years old born in the Netherlands could acquire Dutch citizenship through an administrative procedure. At the same time, the procedure for naturalisation was modified in order to expedite the procedure and make it more attractive. In addition, the Government tried as much as possible to diminish the differences in legal status between nationals and foreigners. For example, in 1985 it granted voting rights in municipal elections to non-nationals who had been residing in the Netherlands for minimum 5 years.¹⁵

In the course of the 1990s the policy became somewhat stricter. A so-called civic integration policy (*inburgeringsbeleid*) was created, by which newcomers have the obligation to take Dutch language courses and courses on the organisation of Dutch society, and need to attend sessions of labour market orientation. The lenient policy practices that allowed immigrants to obtain dual nationality were changed in 1997 into a more restrictive naturalisation policy practice, which explicitly discouraged duel citizenship (Entzinger, 2003; Penninx, 2005). It is estimated that around 50 per cent of Turks and Moroccans hold Dutch citizenship (Klausen, 2005).

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¹⁵ Franchise Act 1985; Under the Constitution, only Dutch nationals have the right to vote and stand in Parliamentary and provincial elections. However, Article 130 of the 1983 Constitution provides for the possibility that the right to elect members of a municipal council and the right to be a member of a municipal council may be granted by Act of Parliament to residents who are not Dutch nationals provided they fulfill at least the requirements applicable to residents who are Dutch nationals; Section B3 of the Franchise Act and Section 21 of the Municipalities Act require them to have resided in the Netherlands for a consecutive period of at least five years, with a valid residence permit.
2. Identity and religiosity

2.1 Religiosity

At the beginning of the 1990s, studies on young people and Islam emphasised the fact that young Muslims who were born or raised in the Netherlands often experienced Islam differently from their parents. The anthropologist Thijl Sunier conducted a study among young Turkish Muslims in Rotterdam in the early 1990s. He noted that for Turkish young Muslims, Islam was disconnected from its ethnic connotations. Furthermore, individual choice and conscious conviction became more important, and religion became an “ethnic frame of reference” by which young people tried to obtain a position in Dutch society (Sunier, 1996: 225ff). The number of studies on young people and Islam has grown significantly in recent years; they reveal a variety of different forms of religiosity and religious experience among Muslims in the Netherlands (De Koning and Bartels, 2005; Demant, 2005; De Koning, 2006; Phalet et al., 2000).

A majority of the Turkish and Moroccan population say that they practise the religion at least partly. More than 60 per cent of the Moroccans and 30 per cent of the Turks pray five times a day. One third of the Turks never pray. More than one third of the Moroccans and almost a quarter of the Turks hold the opinion that Muslim girls should wear a headscarf (SCP, 2005: 126). For the younger generations, subjective religious perception is increasingly disconnected from religious participation. Many young people see themselves as Muslims and find it important to be a Muslim, but they participate less in religious practices and activities than their parents (SCP, 2005).

The Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) produced an important recent report, *Muslims in the Netherlands*, on Muslim identity and religious perception. This study concluded that only 3 per cent of the Moroccans and only 5 per cent of the Turks in the Netherlands see themselves as non-religious (Phalet & Ter Wal, 2004). By contrast, only 35 per cent of *autochtonen* consider themselves as belonging to a religion (CBS 2005: 120). For most Turks and Moroccans Islam is of significant personal importance. For Muslim minorities in the Netherlands, religious dissimilarity with regard to the majority population largely overlaps with the ethnic dividing line between immigrant and native groups and cultures. That is also why ethnic identity — by being coupled with religion and with religious identity in a new way — can obtain a new significance for immigrants and their offspring. The reconstruction of Muslim identity in the migration context can be seen as a form of ‘religious ethnicity’: the ethnic identity is brought into connection with a religious identity (i.e. Islam), which is shared with members of other ethnic groups (Phalet & Ter Wal, 2004).

In addition to an ethnic-religious identity, for many Turks and Moroccans, their ethnic national identity is important. Interestingly, among young Moroccans, their ethnic-religious identity is significantly stronger than their ethnic-national identity; in other words they identify more with being a Muslim than with being a Moroccan (Phalet, 2003). In contrast with the first generation, the second generation experiences a decrease of the ethnic-national

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16 Phalet, Van Lotringen and Entzinger studied the opinions of young people in Rotterdam on Islam and the multicultural society. A follow-up study is in the making.
17 These data stem from a survey on the living conditions of *allochtonen* in cities in the Netherlands. This survey included 2,022 Moroccans; 1,864 Turks; 1,746 Antilleans; 2,009 Surinamese; 1,295 *autochtonen*. Further information available in Dutch on the SCP website at: [http://www.scp.nl/miss/LAS.shtml](http://www.scp.nl/miss/LAS.shtml) (accessed 16 February 2007).
18 On this topic of ethnicity, identity and identification, see also the work of Maykel Verkuyten (2002; 2005).
bonds with Morocco. However, the ethnic-religious identity of Turks and Moroccans is strikingly stable across the generations: both the first and the second generation strongly identify with Islam. A marriage with an Islamic partner is still considered very important. It appears that Moroccans even prefer the possibility that their marriage partner be a Muslim over the possibility that he or she be a Moroccan (Hooghiemstra, 2003; Kanmaz, 2003).

Although Islam remains important for younger generations, there is greater inclination towards religious individualism than in the older generations. Islam seems to play a key role in the reinvention of ethnic identities, especially for younger generations of Moroccans. While for the first generation religion is linked to national identity, this is less and less the case for the second generation. This ‘disconnection’ coincides with the trend whereby Islam is not only (re)valued as religion and as a set of religious beliefs, but also valued as an ‘identity marker’ (Phalet, 2003). The shared religion is considered of more importance than the shared origin and language. This can be seen as the expression of a sense of connectedness with an ‘imaginary community’ of believers; a trans-national religious community that is no longer linked to the country of origin.

Phalet and Ter Wal suggest that there is a relationship between education and participation in the labour market, and the importance of religion: those who have a higher education and stable employment are less religiously involved (Phalet & Ter Wal, 2004). This functions in two ways, however, in that social exclusion can lead to more active religious participation. A Moroccan or Turkish ethnic orientation also has a perpetuating effect on the importance of Islam. Those who favour the language of the country of origin and are less able to speak the Dutch language view Islam as more important, as do those who better identify with Moroccans and Turks and have more Moroccan or Turkish friends, and those who watch more Moroccan or Turkish broadcasting media (Phalet & Ter Wal, 2004).  

2.2 Radicalisation of Muslim young people

On the morning of 2 November 2004 the Islamic extremist Mohammed B. murdered the filmmaker and feared columnist Theo van Gogh in the streets of Amsterdam. The victim called himself a jester, and continuously referred to Muslims as “goat-fuckers”, so formulating a robust anti-Muslim rhetoric. The murder itself was theatrical and bizarre, including the cutting of the throat of the dying victim and the nailing of a threatening letter onto his chest with a knife. This act was meant to create terror, and was successful. Mohammed B. was part of a group of young radical Muslims, the so-called Hofstadgroup. Over the course of 2004 and 2005, 14 members of this group were arrested. Most of them were convicted of membership of a criminal terrorist organisation and planning to attack Dutch politicians, and sentenced for periods of three months up to 15 years in prison.

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19 For literature on the identity of Muslims in the Netherlands, see Phalet, Van Lotringen & Entzinger (2000); Phalet & Ter Wal (eds.) (2004); De Koning and Bartels (2005); De Koning (2006); and Shadid (2006).

20 See “Zware straffen voor leden Hofstadgroep” in NRC Handelsblad March 10 2006. This was the first time the new Crimes of Terrorism Act (which entered into force on 10 August 2004) was applied by a Dutch court. Under this Act, recruiting for the jihad or conspiring to commit a serious terrorist crime will constitute separate criminal offences. In addition, the maximum custodial sentences for offences such as manslaughter, serious assault, hijacking and abduction will be higher if they are committed with a terrorist aim. In most cases, the maximum sentence will be increased by 50 per cent. For offences that are liable to a maximum custodial sentence of fifteen years, the sentence will be increased to life imprisonment or a maximum of 20 years. The Act thereby implements the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. Recruiting for the jihad has been made a criminal offence in an amendment to Article 205 of the Criminal Code. This makes it possible to impose a sentence even if it is unknown at the time whether the person who was recruited is actually willing to participate in the armed struggle, as part of an organisation. The maximum sentence will be increased from one
Mohammed B., who supposedly planned the murder all by himself, was sentenced to life in prison.

The murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh, on 2 November 2004, became a landmark in the Dutch discussions on Islam and on immigration and integration policies. Many wondered how it was possible that a relatively well-educated and well-integrated Moroccan Muslim of the second generation had turned to an apocalyptic variety of Islamic radicalism.

In November 2004, the Minister for Immigration and Integration, Mrs Rita Verdonk, commissioned a research project on the radicalisation of Muslim young people, which was published in June 2006. The authors interviewed, among others, 22 radical young Muslims. They found the following three dimensions of radicalisation:

1. **The social-cultural dimension**: many Muslim young people struggle with their hybrid identity and the lack of understanding of their parents and the broader environment. For some of these youngsters this leads to feelings of alienation and of being uprooted: they are not ‘really’ Moroccans like their parents of the first generation, but neither are they ‘really’ Dutch. They have a strong need for bonding; to belong to a group. In orthodox and radical Islamic groups, they find the warmth and subculture for which they are looking.

2. **The religious dimension**: many young people in puberty are searching for answers to questions such as “Who am I?” and “What is the meaning of life?” In general, Muslim young people are more oriented towards religion in this search than other young people: they are searching for their own form of religious identity. For some young people this search is more acute than for others, and they feel the need for support and for clear answers. This they can find in the Islamic radical ideology. While they become more and more convinced of the rightness of their orthodox interpretation of Islam, they become more sensitive to ‘Western depravity’. They start to believe that only Islam can purify the world from evil and immorality.

3. **The political-activist dimension**: many Muslim young people feel excluded and discriminated against by the Dutch society. In particular, highly educated young people experience relative deprivation. They feel that they work very hard to forge a career, but still attain less than their native contemporaries. This leads to anger and frustration. Furthermore, many young people experience, as a consequence of their strong identification with Islam, a strong solidarity with their ‘oppressed brothers’ in the rest of the world. They sympathise with Muslims in Iraq, Chechnya, Palestine and Afghanistan. This strengthens their idea that Muslims all over the world are oppressed. Some feel they suffer such grievous wrongs that they turn their back to Dutch society and embrace radical ideology.

A new research with quantitative data on radicalisation of Muslim young people in Amsterdam will be published in Autumn 2006.

### 2.3 Indicators on ‘happiness’

A final interesting characteristic of the population of non-Western origin in the Netherlands concerns their level of ‘happiness’. Almost 90 per cent of the inhabitants of the Netherlands...
aged 12 years and older describe themselves as ‘happy’ or ‘very happy’, and as ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’. But immigrants are less happy than the native Dutch. Specifically, the first generation of non-Western immigrants is remarkably unhappy: more than 25 per cent are ‘less happy’ and ‘less satisfied’ (CBS, 2004). Turks and Moroccans are, on average, even less happy with the Netherlands than the native Dutch. This counts particularly for the first generation: only 35 per cent of the Turkish first generation and 34 per cent of the Moroccan first generation are ‘happy’ or ‘very happy’ with the Netherlands, as opposed to 55 per cent of the native Dutch. Only a small proportion (20 per cent) is of the opinion that the next generation will be happier with the Netherlands, as opposed to one third of the native population.
3. Education

3.1 Educational achievement level
In the last 15 years, the average educational level of non-Western immigrants has increased faster than that of the native Dutch. Yet their educational attainment level is still significantly lower than the level of the native Dutch. Only less than 10 per cent of the Turks and Moroccans have finished higher education or university education. About 40 per cent of the Turks and 45 per cent of the Moroccans are not educated or are educated only to the primary education level. However, the second generation of non-Western immigrants is better educated than the first generation (SCP, 2005).

Young Turks and Moroccans generally lag behind considerably in education in comparison to native young people. In primary school, the linguistic achievements of Turkish pupils in the final year are almost 2.5 years behind those of native pupils. The achievements of Moroccan pupils are two years behind those of native pupils. The achievements of Turkish and Moroccan pupils in mathematics in the final year are about half a year behind those of native Dutch pupils (SCP, 2005). In the last 15 years, Turkish and Moroccan pupils have reduced this gap in attainment by one third for languages and by half in mathematics. This reduction can be called spectacular, but this does not alter the fact that the arrears at the start of their school career will negatively influence their educational level.

In the Netherlands, secondary education is divided into three levels. Compulsory education begins on the first day of the month following the fifth birthday of a child and lasts until the age of 16 (or earlier if the 12 years of compulsory education have been completed). From then on there is a partial compulsory education of one or two days a week. Compulsory education ends at the age of 17. VMBO (preparatory secondary vocational education) is the less advanced school type; HAVO (higher general preparatory education) and VWO (preparatory scientific education) are more advanced types of secondary education. The less advanced school type has a more practical focus: VMBO students can only proceed to higher secondary vocational training (HBO). The more advanced levels have a more theoretical approach and offer the chance to move on to a wider range of possibilities such as professional colleges and universities (Schriemer, 2004).

In a recent article on Islamic religious education in the Netherlands Shadid and Van Koningsveld write,

> The disadvantage of students with Islamic backgrounds in the secondary and higher forms of education is readily observable in the Netherlands. While Muslim children are overrepresented in primary schools and in the lower types of vocational education, they are markedly underrepresented in all forms of general secondary and higher education.24

A large majority of the Turkish and Moroccan young people in high school attend the primary school type (VMBO) (80 per cent compared to around 50 per cent of native Dutch youth), but

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the proportion that attends advanced levels has grown rapidly. Yet these students do not compare with native young people: almost half of native students attend advanced types of secondary education, compared to just 20 per cent of the Moroccan and Turkish young people (SCP, 2005).

More non-Western than native Dutch students quit their education without completing the full course. About 10 per cent of non-Western foreign pupils are school dropouts at secondary level. Dropout is quite high in the third and fourth years of the VMBO, especially the lowest levels of VMBO. Estimates for the year 2003/2004 show that around 5 per cent of the Turkish pupils and 4 per cent of the Moroccan pupils dropped out of school, in comparison with 2 per cent of the native pupils (SCP, 2005).

The reason for these high rates of dropout is unclear. It may have to do with cultural differences in the school and home situation. Although the Dutch Government has officially committed itself to providing intercultural education, there is no real insight into the extent and ways in which this ideal is accomplished in the schools (Schriemer, 2004). School dropouts can continue their studies without a qualification in the BBL, which is a combination of school and labour. But recent data show that non-Western immigrants seldom use this opportunity (SCP, 2005).

School dropout is still high, but those non-Western pupils who obtain a qualification continue their studies more often than native pupils. The inflow of Turkish and Moroccan young people in higher education has doubled since 1995, even though it is still smaller than the inflow of native Dutch people. The participation of non-native women of most minority groups has risen faster than the participation of men (SCP, 2005).

3.2 Experiences of discrimination in the educational system

In 2004, the EUMC’s Analytical Report on Education stated that it is evident from various complaints registries that discrimination within the educational system does exist (Schriemer, 2004). The regional anti-discrimination agencies receive complaints about discrimination within the educational system on a regular basis. Complaints are also submitted to the Equal Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, CGB) regarding unequal treatment in schools. Complaints of discrimination in schools have many aspects. There are complaints about relations among students and between students and teachers. There are also many complaints from young people who are confronted with discrimination during their internship apprenticeship period, both in searching for a position and in terms of experiences during the internship itself.

Complaints concerning the dress code constitute a serious problem. Wearing the hijab (Islamic headscarf) has proven controversial. In most cases schools have no established policy concerning the wearing of the hijab, but the subject is discussed between students and the directorate on an ad hoc basis. In vocational training, students who wear headscarves run into problems when trying to obtain compulsory internships. There is no accurate picture of

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the relationship between learning lags and discriminatory practices. It is clear, however, that discrimination is detrimental to the educational position.27

3.3 Islamic education and Muslim faith-based schools

Instruction in the Qur’an has been provided for many years in almost all local Muslim organisations, but there was no real breakthrough in the sphere of education until the 1980s. That is when the Muslim broadcasting network began transmitting, when training courses were arranged for imams, and the first Muslim primary schools were opened.

Muslim faith-based schools, also called Muslim denominational schools, are financed by the Government. The first Muslim primary schools opened their doors in Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven and Amsterdam. In 2006 there were 46 Muslim primary schools and two Muslim secondary schools in the Netherlands.28 There are also two new Muslim “universities”, one in Rotterdam, founded in 1997, and one in Schiedam, founded in 2001. These are still private institutions, but they aspire to become recognised as regular universities in the future.

Initiatives have been taken in various municipalities for Muslim religious instruction to be offered in State primary schools; this, however, has actually been achieved only on a very limited scale (see Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2006). A special program training imams is being offered by the Free University in Amsterdam since September 2005. (See Boender and Kanmaz 2002).

Demands have been voiced in public and political debates to limit the possibilities for founding Muslim schools. The national Government has initiated several investigations on Islamic schools since 1989 (for an overview see Driessen and Merry 2006). In the second half of the 1990s, a number of Islamic schools caused a stir because they used videos and lesson material provided by the organisation Al Aqsa, which is affiliated to Hamas, and the Saudi organisation Al Waqf al-Islami. The enquiry focused on the interference of “political Islamic groups and foreign powers in the Islamic education in the Netherlands”29 and showed that Dutch authorities — for example the Inspectorate of Education — have few opportunities to provide a counterweight to the “anti-integrative tendencies” in Islamic primary schools, in Islamic religious education and in teaching native language programmes (Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende Talen).

The Inspectorate for Education (Inspectie van het Onderwijs)30 has published extensive studies on Islamic schools in the Netherlands in 2002 and 2003. In 2003, it was concluded that education in Islamic schools “is not opposed to the central values of the democratic constitutional State, and (that) the schools under examination foster more or less the

27 See also Denessen et al. (2005) and also a special issue of European Education (summer 2006) edited by Wasif A. Shadid, dealing with the consequences of Dutch minority policy in terms of the relationship between religion, ethnicity and education in the Netherlands.
conditions for integration of the pupils”. The study observed that, in addition to the Inspectorate of Education, other regional and local actors could take more responsibility to “keep the conversation going with Islamic schools” and to promote the integration of Muslim pupils with emigrant origins in Dutch society. The municipal authorities are therefore urged to start a dialogue with Islamic schools and to give them a proper status in local society. Recent investigations by the Inspectorate of Education have concluded that almost all the Islamic schools have an open attitude towards Dutch society, and play a positive role in creating conditions for social cohesion (Merry and Driessen, 2005: 422).

In the spring of 2004, the Minister of Education, Van der Hoeven, presented a memorandum to the Lower House which provided that members of School Boards in any new Islamic schools must have Dutch nationality. The Government also announced the development of an adequate method of Muslim religious education. A general ban on Muslim schools was impossible given the constitutional freedom of education (Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, see Shadid and van Koningsveld 2006: 86) The only possibility would be a change of Article 23 and ending the principle of freedom of education and the equal funding of public and confessional schools. This issue was added to the public agenda by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and others.

In September 2006 a study was published on the educational activities of a number of mosque committees in Rotterdam. The study found that their activities focus on strengthening Islamic identity. All of the teaching materials are in Arabic or Turkish, and no attention is paid to the fact that the pupils live in a secular country. The mosque committees hope to bridge the gap with Dutch society by teaching rules of social convention. The study also investigated the possibilities for collaboration with Dutch primary schools. The researchers concluded that the mosques should collaborate with other educational and youth institutions in the district. Focus on the Netherlands in the educational material should be increased, and the teachers should be re-educated.

32 This is being developed together with the Islamic School Boards Organization (ISBO) (see Shadid and van Koningsveld 2006: 83ff.)
34 For literature on Islamic education and Muslim faith-based schools see: Driessen & Merry (2006); Driessen & Merry (2005); and Shadid & Van Koningsveld (2006). Since March 2006, Firdaous Oueslati has been working on a PhD research project on “Individualization, Fragmentation of Authority and New Organizational Forms among Muslims in Europe. Islamic Institutions of Higher Education” at the ISIM in Leiden.
4. Employment

This section addresses the labour market position of the Turkish and Moroccan population in the Netherlands, which are used as a proxy for ‘Muslims in the Netherlands’. It looks in particular at the professional level of Turks and Moroccans, and the impact of direct and indirect discrimination.

4.1 Employment and unemployment levels

Unemployment levels are high in the Turkish and Moroccan communities. 27 per cent of Moroccans and 21 per cent of Turks are unemployed, as opposed to 9 per cent of the native Dutch (SCP, 2006). Unemployment of immigrants has doubled since the beginning of the economic recession in 2002, and as a result the decline of the unemployment of immigrants that started between 1995 and 2001 has practically been nullified.

In particular, the elderly have a low social-economic position. Almost half of the non-Western immigrants and 67 per cent of the native Dutch have a salaried job of more than 12 hours per week in 2004. Of all non-Western immigrants who have a job, 16 per cent have a flexible labour contract compared to 6 per cent of the native Dutch. Less than 50 per cent of Turks have a salaried job, although lower than the average for non-Western immigrants, this is still higher than the figure for Moroccans, where only one third have a salaried job. The participation of Moroccans in the labour force is, in the light of their long residence, strikingly unfavourable. Compared to Moroccans, Turks are likely to be self-employed and to have their own businesses.

To determine professional level, one can distinguish between elementary-level, lower-level, medium-level, higher-level and scholarly jobs. More than half of the Turks and 60 per cent of the Moroccans have a job at the elementary or lower level (SCP, 2005). In comparison, 28 per cent of the native Dutch have jobs at those levels. The differences in professional level can in principle be ascribed to individual characteristics, such as sex, age and educational level. But the proportion of Moroccans and Turks in elementary-level and lower-level jobs has declined between 1996 and 2003. They are increasingly active in medium-level or higher-level jobs. A middle class is beginning to emerge. This development continues steadily, even in times of economic malaise. This is due to the increase in level of education in combination with the outflow of older cohorts, who generally work in lower-level jobs (SCP, 2005).

Of the non-Western immigrants aged between 15 and 65, 25 per cent depend on social benefits (for the elderly, for those unfit for work, or public assistance). This number is almost twice as high as it is for the native Dutch. Poverty is high among Moroccans and Turks. 67 per cent of the Turkish elderly and 86 per cent of the Moroccan elderly have a low income versus 11 per cent of the native Dutch elderly (SCP, 2003). This is caused by their low professional level, the lack of a supplementary pension, an insufficient old age pension, and the presence of just one income per household. Due to this poor labour market position, one third of all Moroccan households must make ends meet with an income below the poverty threshold; this percentage is three to four times as high as that of the native Dutch (Vrooman et al., 2005). Moroccan households must make ends meet with an average of €13,000 Euros per year, while the average income in Turkish households is €13,600. For native Dutch households, the corresponding figure is €20,000 per year (SCP, 2005).
4.2 Discrimination in the labour market
The lower educational attainment levels of immigrants, as compared to the native Dutch, provides one explanation for their higher unemployment rates. But differences in education and age cannot explain all the discrepancies.

Much research has been initiated on this question in the last few years, and there are clear indications of direct and indirect discrimination in the labour market (SCP, 2005). This is particularly the case in a supply-driven labour market, where employers have ample choice in selecting new employees. Many employers discriminate on the basis of ethnic origin when employing new staff, either consciously or subconsciously, directly or indirectly (Houtzager & Rodrigues, 2002). In the selection process in many companies, subjective criteria regarding personality or attitude of the candidate are not described in protocols. This leaves room for normative elements in the selection, which can be disadvantageous for non-Western immigrants.

Research carried out for the International Labour Organization (See Zegers de Beijl et al., 2000) led to the remarkable conclusion that discrimination against non-Western immigrants in the labour market occurs more often in the Netherlands than in neighbouring countries (see Houtzager & Rodrigues, 2002). Employers prefer native employees because they rate their skills as being higher than those of non-Western immigrants. Whether this is based on previous experiences or from hearsay seems of no importance. Therefore, a biased perception towards non-Western immigrants hinders their chances in the labour market.

Once hired, employees of non-Western descent are often confronted by colleagues who do not accept them (see Houtzager & Rodrigues, 2002). Specific information regarding anti-Islamic incidents in the work environment is not being collected. However, the Dutch report on Islamophobia after 11 September 2001 concludes that relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in employment situations have become more complex since 11 September. Complaints were filed about a reduction of tolerance on the work floor towards wearing headscarves, prayer opportunities or people of (presumed) Islamic belief in general.

There also appears to be a difference in the way in which non-Western immigrants and the native Dutch seek employment. Non-Western immigrants often look for work within their own ethnic group and use a network of family members, friends or relations. By doing so, they often end up in low-paid employment. They do not consult classified advertisements as often as native job seekers do. Non-Western immigrants are already quite familiar with the services of the (semi-governmental) Centre for Work and Income (Centrum voor Werk en Inkomen, CWI), and with temporary employment agencies and other organisations. But employers rarely use the CWI when looking for new staff. Instead, they prefer to use their own, often informal, channels, or media that do not reach non-Western job seekers. So demand and supply do not meet (Houtzager & Rodrigues, 2002).

5 Housing

5.1 Patterns of settlement
Non-Western immigrants are traditionally concentrated in the west of the Netherlands, and especially in the four major cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. In these cities, 30 per cent of inhabitants belong to non-Western ethnic groups (Nieuwboer, 2003). In the other municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, this proportion is 10 per cent, and in smaller municipalities it is 5 per cent.

This ethnic concentration in the major cities and in specific neighbourhoods increased between 1995 and 2004. In 2004, there were more than 450 neighbourhoods (of a total of 11,000 neighbourhoods) in the Netherlands with more than 25 per cent immigrant inhabitants; in more than 90 cases, this percentage was 50 per cent. Almost all of these ‘concentration neighbourhoods’ are situated in the four major cities; together they account for 10 per cent of all neighbourhoods in these cities (SCP, 2005). ‘Concentration neighbourhoods’ are characterised by deterioration, and less social cohesion. Inhabitants are often victims of crime and feel less safe. Consequently, one in three non-Western immigrant households are dissatisfied with their residential area, and for Moroccan households this number even reaches 50 per cent. By contrast, only one out of twelve native households are dissatisfied with their residential area. (CBS, 2004).

There is evidence of segregation in the Netherlands, as well as poorer living conditions for the non-Western population in comparison with the native population. According to Veldboer & Duyvendak, equality in the housing market is negatively influenced by three factors: exodus (middle- and higher-income households leaving for better districts), displacement (low-income households forced to leave because of the composition of more mixed districts) and reduced freedom of choice caused by the scarcity in the housing market (Nieuwboer, 2003). These mechanisms can be seen as unintentional forms of exclusion, but not as discrimination in the sense of intentional subordination.

The concentration of underprivileged immigrants will increase in the major cities if national and local policies are not changed. The relocation to the suburbs of the native Dutch — and increasingly also of the immigrant — middle-class population, is enhancing this process. Almost two out of three non-Western immigrants are born in the major cities. From the period of 2020 onwards, this is expected to have significant affects on the school population and the labour markets in those cities (SCP, 2004).

5.2 Interaction between immigrants and native Dutch
The spatial segregation of sections of the population coheres with limited social interaction. 70 per cent of the Turks and 60 per cent of the Moroccans associate predominantly with members of their own ethnic group. Two thirds of the native population have little or no contact at all with immigrants (SCP, 2005). The contacts in leisure time between Turks and Moroccans and the native Dutch have declined in the last ten years. Notably, Turks and Moroccans of the second generation have associated less with the native Dutch in latter years. The presence of immigrants in the neighbourhood is beneficial for the contacts with the native

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37 For literature on housing of non-Western immigrants and segregation, see SCP (2005), Uit elkaar buurt. De invloed van ethische concentratie op integratie en beeldvorming. See also: Nieuwboer (2003), National Analytical Study on Housing. Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (DUMC); and RMO (2005), Niet langer met de ruggen naar elkaar. Een advies over verbinden.
Dutch, but if the majority of people in the neighbourhood are immigrants, communication between natives and immigrants diminishes. Also a rapid inflow of immigrants in the neighbourhood in a relatively short period of time (five years) has a negative influence, because then the native Dutch feel threatened by this inflow (SCP, 2005).

In more or less segregated neighbourhoods and districts, conflicts with newcomers regularly occur. Sometimes non-Western residents are harassed out of the districts where they live. The actions of neighbourhood residents are occasionally violent: bricks are thrown through windows and car tyres punctured. Besides these extreme cases, there are also disputes for which solutions are found by means of arbitration or projects, as a result of which more social cohesion is created (see: Nieuwboer, 2003).
6 Health and social protection

6.1 Health situation of immigrants
The Turkish and Moroccan elderly are often in a worse health situation than the native Dutch elderly. 46 per cent of the Turkish elderly and 57 per cent of the Moroccan elderly have serious physical limitations, as compared to 15 per cent of the native Dutch elderly (SCP, 2004). Often, the cause of this is their socio-economic status and probably also their lifestyle. Frequency of visits to the doctors may be one indicator of health status. The SCP found that 72 per cent of the Turkish elderly and 70 per cent of the Moroccan elderly had consulted a general practitioner in a period of two months, compared to 48 per cent of the native Dutch elderly. Furthermore, the Turkish elderly had used more prescription medications than other groups of the elderly (SCP, 2004).

There is a particularly high mortality risk among adult Turkish males. Already from a relatively young age, these men have an above-average chance of cardiovascular diseases. Their risk of dying from lung cancer is also relatively high; this is most probably linked to smoking (SCP, 2005). By contrast, the mortality risk for Moroccan men aged over 35 is much lower. Their risk of dying of cardiovascular diseases in their forties, fifties or sixties is only 1.5 times that for the native Dutch. Their probability of dying of lung cancer is also much smaller than for Turkish men.

6.2 Care for the elderly
Among Moroccans, three quarters are of the opinion that their children must take care of them when they are old. Elderly Turkish people do prefer family care, but this preference is less pronounced than that of Moroccans. Native Dutch elderly people expect the least from their children regarding care. About half of all Moroccans aged over 55, and 30 per cent of all Turkish elderly people, receive informal help, mostly from those of their children or the children’s partner who live at home. Only 10 per cent of the native elderly get such informal help (SCP, 2004).

Almost 20 per cent of the native elderly population use homecare services. This percentage is much lower among the Turks and Moroccans, at 7 per cent and 1 per cent respectively (SCP, 2004). The low level of use of homecare services is understandable in the light of the informal help that is received. In such a situation, regional institutions often do not provide homecare. Moreover, a many elderly people have never heard of homecare services. Some do not know how to apply for this kind of service, while others believe that it is too expensive. However, those who receive homecare are usually satisfied: the service meets their expectations, enough time is devoted to the elderly, and the co-workers take account of the importance of faith and culture (SCP, 2004).

There are few non-Western elderly people in nursing homes. This is in part the consequence of the young age profile of this group, as well as the fact that they generally do not live alone, and are more likely to rely on their children for help. A negative perception of such homes also causes a disinclination to use them (SCP, 2004). However, once people have visited a nursing home, their opinion is more positive. A small percentage of elderly Muslim people say that they may be interested in a nursing home, but only if Islamic traditions are observed there. This means, inter alia, the provision of halal food, a prayer room and having an imam who is available when needed (Alkema 2003).
In October 2006 a private entrepreneur, Paul Sturkenboom, announced plans to build a Muslim hospital in Rotterdam. The ‘halal’ hospital was to be established within two years. It would have separate sections for men and women. Male patients would be looked after by male personnel, and female patients by female personnel. The food in the hospital was to be prepared according to Muslim prescriptions, there would be a prayer room and a special ‘hospital imam’. The idea was to finance the new hospital, which would cost between €30 million and €40 million, with contributions from Dutch real estate companies. These plans caused a small outcry in Dutch public debate. Following questions by the far right politician Geert Wilders in the Lower House, the Minister of Integration (Verdonk) and of Health (Hoogervorst) stated that they thought an ‘Islamic hospital’ was “not desirable from the viewpoint of integration”. However, the ministers also said that if all legal requirements were respected nothing could obstruct its establishment. Under Dutch law, anyone can establish a hospital that attuned to the needs of a specific group of patients.  

7. Policing and security

Little is known about the experiences of Muslims in relation to criminal justice and policing. This section focuses on the representation of employees with immigrant origins in the police force in general, and presents accounts of discrimination experienced by these employees.

7.1 Representation of people with an immigrant background in the police force

Despite recruitment policies aimed at attracting more police officers with an immigrant background (multiculturalisation policies), the number of officers with an immigrant background remains low (Houtzager & Rodrigues, 2002). In 2004 and 2005, 6.4 per cent of all employees of the 25 police forces in the Netherlands were employees with immigrant origins.39 However, in absolute terms, half of all Dutch police forces in fact employed fewer immigrants in 2005 than in 2004.

In the major cities, where one third of the population has an immigrant background, the percentage of employees with an immigrant background is around 6 per cent. There are, however, great differences between police regions. In Holland-Midden the number of employees with an immigrant background increased by 0.5 percentage points over 2005, while in North and East Gelderland and Flevoland, this percentage decreased by 1.2 percentage points and 1 percentage point respectively. The police regions Amsterdam-Amstelland and Rotterdam Rijnmond have the most non-Western employees in absolute numbers, 623 and 664 respectively. In contrast, the regions IJsselmond, North Holland and Friesland only employ a few people with an immigrant background: between 20 and 30. Zeeland is the ‘whitest’ region, with only 12 immigrants employed (1.2 per cent) (see Kerngegevens Politie 2005.)

The low level of employees with an immigrant background in the police force is in part sustained by the negative experiences, such as discrimination. Many policemen and policewomen with an immigrant background in fact leave their jobs because of the discriminatory atmosphere at work (Houtzager & Rodrigues, 2002). In some regions, this results in a status quo: the inflow of employees with an immigrant background is equal to the outflow. Many have difficulties in forging a career inside the police force. They feel that native colleagues have better chances of getting a promotion. Such feelings are strengthened by the fact that only a few employees with an immigrant background fulfil an executive function.40

In order to hire more police executives with an immigrant background, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations paid special attention to graduates from the Police Academy. In the early 1990s, 25 police inspectors with an immigrant background graduated at the Police Academy. Of these 25 people, only 11 still work for the police today. The main reason for dropping out for the former officers was that it appeared impossible to have a career inside the police force.41 At this moment, complaints about discrimination and intimidation of two Moroccan police inspectors are being investigated in the police region of Gelderland-Midden. This case has boosted the discussion about discrimination inside the police force.

41 “Discriminatie probleem bij meer korpsen”, NRC Handelsblad, 19 August 2006
Furthermore, as a result of the accounts of discrimination in the media, the National Ombudsman started an investigation as well.42

7.2 Criminality and victims of crime
At the other end of the judicial system, the situation is completely different. While it is difficult to get employees with an immigrant background to join the police force, non-natives are overrepresented in the crime statistics. Although there is little information on the experiences of Muslims as victims of crimes, there are some statistics on the number of Turks and Moroccans suspected of committing crimes. More than 18 per cent of the Moroccans are registered by the police as suspects of a crime, compared to 4 per cent of the native Dutch (SCP, 2005).

Both first- and second-generation Moroccans are considerably more often suspected of committing a criminal offence than the native Dutch, or any other ethnic group. Likewise, Turkish young people between 18 and 24 years of age, of whom one parent is born abroad, score highly in these statistics and are relatively often suspected of committing criminal offences.

7.3 Prisons
In 2004, one third of all prisoners were non-Western immigrants; 7 per cent were Moroccan young people. 20 per cent of the prisoners describe themselves as Muslim (Spruit et al., 2003). Of the prisoners in youth prisons, Muslims even outnumber the other denominations (26 per cent, followed by 20 per cent Catholics).

Although Imams are present in most of the prisons, they fill less permanent positions than their Protestant and Catholic counterparts. While in most prisons Protestant and Catholic clergymen are present full time, Imams are only present half of the time. Not surprisingly, almost half of the prison directors hold the opinion that there are not enough Imams.43

42 See the website of the National Ombudsman (de Nationale ombudsman) at: http://www.nationaleombudsman.nl (16 February 2007).
43 For literature on Imams in prisons, see Spruit et al. (2003), Hendrickx & De Lange (2004) and Hanrath (2000).
8. Discrimination and anti-Muslim discourse and mobilisation

8.1 Discrimination
Data from the Rotterdam Youth Survey (Phalet et al., 2000) found that more than 50 per cent of the minority young people said they experienced discrimination sometimes, while about 15 per cent said they were personally discriminated against on a regular or frequent basis. Minorities perceive discrimination mostly as a structural phenomenon, which is not directed at them personally. Native Dutch, on the other hand, perceive discrimination as an incidental phenomenon, occurring more in the personal spheres of life, for example in daily contacts, while going out or at school. Between 5 and 15 per cent of the minority youth said they had either definitely or probably had had to deal with racial harassment (intimidation or the use of violence for racist reasons) in the last two years. Physical and mostly verbal aggression seems to appear mostly among a small group of young adults under the age of 25 who experience difficulty in dealing with conflict.

According to this research over a quarter of young Moroccans felt that they faced structural discrimination, while 25 per cent did not feel discriminated against at all (Phalet et al., 2000). Of the young Turkish people, 20 per cent felt they faced structural discrimination, and one in three not at all. Young Turkish people reported experiencing the most discrimination through the neglect of their neighbourhoods (less maintenance), followed by the behaviour of the police (more police checking), and the governmental social services (longer waiting times). Young Moroccans reported experiencing the most discrimination from the behaviour of the police, followed neglect of their neighbourhood, and the business world (being fired more often).

In 2003, 74 per cent of the Moroccans were of the opinion that in general there is discrimination in the Netherlands, ranging from ‘now and then’ to ‘very often’ (Dagevos et al., 2003). Personal discrimination was reported much less: 37 per cent of the Moroccans felt personally discriminated against, also ranging from ‘now and then’ to ‘very often’. In 2003, 270 complaints about discrimination based on religion were filed (IHF, 2005). Muslims filed most of those complaints, and 40 per cent of the cases concerned the wearing of the headscarf by Muslim women.

Discrimination has a significant effect on religious participation and religious perception (SCP, 2004). Turks and Moroccans, who feel discriminated against either personally or as a group, attach more importance to their religious identity. In the case of Moroccans, there is a relation between the degree of discrimination and the importance attached to the recognition of Islam: the recognition of Islam is more important for Moroccans who report experiencing discrimination, than for Moroccans who do not report experiencing discrimination. This relation does not hold for Turks.

The EUMC report on Islamophobia in the EU after September 11 noted a significant number (80) of incidents, including insults, graffiti and threats (53 incidents), and vandalism and acts

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44 The data came from the Rotterdam Youth Survey, for which 900 young adults between the age of 18 and 30 were interviewed. The comparative framework of this research was ensured by matching the randomised samples of Turkish and Moroccan youth against a group of native Dutch youth in the same neighbourhoods and with a comparable (mostly low) schooling level. Consequently, the Dutch sample is not representative of all native Dutch in Rotterdam, but maximally comparable with the minority youth.
of aggression against Muslims and Islamic symbols (13 incidents) in the Netherlands. A report on racism and extreme right-wing activism published in November 2004 reported several incidents in 2003, including graffiti on a Muslim school in Rotterdam (“Muslims fuck off”, “Muslim parasites”) and graffiti on mosques in Venray, Weert and Bussum (Donselaar and Rodrigues, 2004: 22).

There were also a number of violent incidents after the assassination of Theo Van Gogh on 2 November 2004. There were numerous small-scale attacks of vandalism against mosques and Muslim schools. On 7 November 2004, a small bomb exploded at the entrance of a Muslim primary school in Eindhoven. On 13 November 2004 a small house of worship in Helden in the province of Limburg was destroyed by a fire caused by radical right-wing youth (see Witte et al., 2005). Muslims organised nightly surveillance of mosques in many Dutch towns to protect the buildings from vandalism. Most dramatic was, without any doubt, the destruction by fire of a Muslim primary school in Uden on 1 December 2004. The attackers, right-wing young people, had painted symbols of ‘white power’ on the building and referred to the assassination of Theo Van Gogh (“Theo Rest in Peace (R.I.P)”). This event caused great distress among the Dutch Muslim communities and led Dutch politicians — such as Prime Minister Balkenende — to publicly speak out against the attacks against Muslims. The Mayor of Uden stated in a speech during a protest march “Those who attack our children attack our society.” The London bomb attacks of 7 July 2005 did not lead to a wave of new acts of violence, but on 16 July the windows of a mosque in Naaldwijk were smashed and on 23 July the windows of a Turkish community centre were broken.

The Netherlands has an extensive set of legal means to combat discrimination and racism. The Commission on Equal Treatment was set up in 1994 as part of the Equal Treatment Act, which was designed to “combat discrimination and unequal treatment in the sphere of civil law, and which is gradually becoming the most important instrument in the Netherlands to fight discrimination outside the sphere of the Criminal Code”. The National Bureau against Racial Discrimination (Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van rassendiscriminatie, LBR) is a national centre of expertise for the prevention of racial discrimination. The bureau closely collaborates with several local bureaus for the prevention of discriminations, in order to monitor and prevent racism and discrimination. An exemplary project is called “School without Racism”.

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45 See “Anti-Islamic reactions in the EU after the terroristor acts against the USA. the Netherlands” (2002), also “Moslim is een besmet word. De interetnische wrijvingen in Nederland na ‘911’”, in NRC Handelsblad, 17/18 May 2003. See also IHF (2005) “Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in the EU. Developments since September 11. The Netherlands”.
46 The press reported numerous incidents involving vandalism and attacks against mosques in the week following the assassination of Theo van Gogh, notably in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Breda and Huizen Veghel.
47 See NRC-Handelsblad, 9 November 2004.
50 Further information on The National Bureau against Racial Discrimination (Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van rassendiscriminatie, LBR) in English is available on their website at: http://www.lbr.nl/?node=73&PHPSESSID=4f83a9ed668ff02590895be48dca2f6d (accessed 21 February 2007).
51 Further information on the “School without Racism” (“School Zonder Racisme”) project is available at: http://www.lbr.nl/?node=1257 (accessed 16 February 2007).
Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and especially since the murder of Theo van Gogh, there has been growing concern in the Netherlands about acts of violence against Muslims and against Islamic institutions such as mosque buildings and Muslim schools. After the burning of the mosque in Helden in November 2004 the Minister for Immigration and Integration installed a number of ‘intervention teams’, which served to advise municipalities on dealing with and preventing inter-ethnic tensions and violence (see Witte et al., 2005). These initiatives have been carried out together with FORUM, the Institute for Multicultural Development in Utrecht. The Institute has developed several projects for Muslim young people in the Netherlands, and advised local authorities about ways to prevent ethnic tensions and to develop more understanding of the various ways of being Muslim in Dutch society.52

9 Participation and citizenship

9.1 Political participation
Turks have a notably larger turnout at local elections than Moroccans, while both groups are comparable in age, educational level and voting rights. Based on statistics from the four major cities, plus Arnhem, for 1994 and 1998, and from both Amsterdam and Rotterdam for 2002, it can be concluded that the turnout of Moroccans is smaller than that of the native Dutch (Martinez et al., 2002). The turnout of Turks at several elections is equal or even larger than the turnout of the native Dutch.

Turks also have more confidence in political institutions than Moroccans (Fennema & Tillie, 2000). While more than 60 per cent of the Turkish population in Amsterdam have confidence in politics, this holds for only 40 per cent of the Moroccan population. If there is a candidate of their own ethnic group, a large majority of the Turks (90 per cent) vote for this candidate, but this holds much less for the Moroccans (somewhat more than 50 per cent) (Martinez et al., 2002). Otherwise, the overwhelming majority of Turks and Moroccans vote Labour.

Fennema & Tillie (1999, 2000) provide a possible explanation for these differences. They point out that Turks have more social capital than other ethnic communities. In comparison to Moroccans, Turks have more organisations, and the networks between these organisations are closer. They argue that this social capital leads to more political participation and political trust. The fact that the political participation and political trust of Turks is much stronger than that of Moroccans shows that Turks in general find the political system more legitimate than Moroccans do.

Following the 2003 elections, the Lower House of Parliament has at least ten members from Muslim background (out of 150 members). Nebahat Albayrak (Labour Party, Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), Coskun Çörüz (Christian Democratic Alliance, Christen-Democratisch Appeal, CDA), Fatma Koser Kaya (Democratic 66, Democraten ’66) and Fadime Örgü are of Turkish background. Khadija Arib (Labour Party), Naima Azough (Green Left, Groen Links) and Ali Lazrak (Lazrak) are of Moroccan ancestry. Also in the legislature are Iranian born Farah Karimi (Green Left), Nirmala Rambocus (Surinam, CDA), and Ayaan Hirsi-Ali. The November 2006 elections saw the election of Tofik Dibi (Green Left) and Sadet Karabulut, (Socialist Party, Socialistische Partij, SP) both of Turkish background.

In a study based on newspaper coverage, carried out in the Netherlands, France and Britain, Statham et al. argue that the Dutch case shows that granting multicultural rights does not necessarily strengthen political integration in multiethnic societies (Statham et al., 2005: 453).

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53 A follow-up study is Van Heelsum & Tillie (2006), Opkomst en partijvoorkeur van migranten bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 7 maart 2006.
55 In May 2006, Hirsi Ali resigned from Parliament when her Dutch citizenship was revoked because of the fact that she had lied about her name and age on her asylum application in 1992. The decision to revoke her citizenship was taken under the political responsibility of Minister Rita Verdonk and caused political and public turmoil, especially because the inaccuracy of the information on Hirsi Ali’s asylum application had been publicly known for many years. Hirsi Ali declared that her decision to resign from Parliament and apply for a job at the American Enterprise Institute was also related to the fact that she would have to vacate her secure Government apartment in September 2006, because her neighbours won a lawsuit complaining that her presence exposed them to risk.
The study found that claims by migrants for ‘group demands’ — group-specific rights, recognition, and exemption from duties — turn out to be significant only for Muslims. The authors argue that, in comparison to Britain and France, Dutch multiculturalism creates an opportunity structure that channels migrant claims toward cultural group demands, and away from the pressing socio-economic disadvantages that many Muslims face (Statham et al., 2005: 454).

In addition to the regular political parties, there are a few specific immigrant movements, such as the Arabic European League (AEL) and the Muslim Democratic Party (MDP). The AEL was established in Antwerp by the Lebanese Belgian Dyab Abou Jahjah in 1993. The AEL tries to promote and to defend the interests of Arabic and Islamic immigrant communities in Europe.56 Their main goal is to strengthen the social-economic position of their own community and to maintain positive relations with others, based on mutual respect and tolerance.

In the Netherlands there was considerable discussion when the AEL started a Dutch division. In the report From Dawa to Jihad (2004), the National Security Service (AIVD) calls the AEL a Muslim nationalistic movement, since its main target is the emancipation of Muslims and it seems to exclude non-Muslims. It is difficult to estimate the influence of the AEL; although there was much fuss about the start of the Dutch division, with very well-attended meetings and much publicity, not much has been heard from the AEL since then (Douwes et al., 2005).

The establishment of the Muslim Democratic Party was an initiative of the AEL. The main goal of this party is to stand up for the interests of Muslims in the Netherlands. The aim was to take part in the local elections in the four major cities in 2006, but this never happened. Since the first rumours about the establishment of the MDP, it has been very quiet, and it now appears as if the MDP has quietly faded away.

9.2 Civil society
At first Muslims in the Netherlands led a rather ‘concealed’ existence, but they have gradually pressed for the establishment of institutions that, inter alia, would enable them to practise their religion. Almost immediately after their arrival in the Netherlands, they sought opportunities for the observance of collective prayer, and established places of worship. At first these were unofficial (in residential or business premises), but gradually dedicated foundations or associations were set up to develop ‘real’ mosques. Today there are almost 400 places of worship or mosques in the Netherlands, although it must be added that many organisations are still struggling with problems of accommodation.

In the political sphere little happened at first. Contacts between Muslim organisations and the Government were limited to practical problems, such as ritual slaughter, or the establishment or financing of places of worship. This began to change in the course of the 1980s, when contacts became less occasional and informal. Separate Muslim political parties or trade unions did not appear to be viable. In some places, and also nationally, federal leagues of Muslim associations and foundations were set up to represent their constituents in discussions with the government on specific policy matters.

The first Islamic organisations in the Netherlands were mainly mosque organisations that tried to meet the basic needs of Muslim immigrants, such as the need for prayer rooms, religious leaders and teahouses. From the end of the 1970s several mosque organisations broadened their activities and started to organise activities for children, such as instruction in the Qur’an, Arabic language lessons, after-school child care and homework supervision. In the Netherlands the Turkish organisations took the lead in this, both through the organisations that operated under the wings of Diyanet (the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs), and through other organisations such as Milli Görüş and the Süleymanlı.

In the 1980s, the mosque organisations proved able to mobilise many supporters. As immigrant organisations, they also achieved a strong position in civil society, thanks to the existing legislation and the protection of freedom of religion. During this time there was a struggle between the developing Muslim organisations and the existing secular immigrant organisations. This conflict centred on the issue of which organisations should speak on behalf of the immigrant population, and were the representatives of the Turkish and Moroccan populations.

Since the 1980s, the Islamic organisations had claimed that they had the right to municipal subsidies for their activities. However, as policy became more focused on integration, the Foundations for Foreign Workers began to disappear and secular immigrant organisations began to play a more prominent role. Representatives of secular immigrant organisations were in close touch with the municipal social and community work. In 1987, secular Turkish immigrant community workers spoke in Rotterdam about the danger of ‘fundamentalist mosques’, which were out to organise as many activities as possible, to accentuate the separation between Muslims and non-Muslims and to develop mosques in Rotterdam into “a state within a state” (see Buijs, 1998: 55ff). In spite of the often polemical discussions and the competition with secular organisations, Muslim organisations have succeeded in becoming among the most important organisations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Many Muslim organisations proved able to obtain and maintain a strong grassroots presence, and by setting up all kind of activities they tried to involve young people in their organisations.

By the end of the 1980s, disagreements and disputes arose within the Turkish Muslim organisations between older and younger generations. This was, inter alia, due to the understanding of younger Muslims that for their future they had to orient themselves towards the Netherlands and that they had to break away from the social standing of their parents (Sunier, 1996: 223).

Since the 1990s, a similar conflict between generations has arisen in Moroccan Muslim organisations (see Canatan et al., 2003). Mosque committees are mostly administered by first-generation men, many of whom have received almost no education and hardly speak Dutch. Many policy-makers are convinced that it is necessary for women and younger people to begin to play a more important role in Muslim organisations in the Netherlands. They believe that if Muslim organisations manage to become more attractive to younger Muslims, this might prevent young people from going astray and, as a consequence, being seduced by the discourses of Islamic fundamentalism or radicalism.

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57 This image needs to be handled carefully, though, because the Turkish Muslim organisations in The Netherlands are administered by a highly qualified staff (see Sunier, 1996; Canatan, 2001).
A second and related issue is the need for a more adequate training of imams in the Netherlands. The constant influx of foreign imams, who are unfamiliar with Dutch society and with the specific needs of Muslims in the Netherlands, is seen by policy officials as problematic. The imams are said to be unable to help young Muslims. The fact that young people might more and more abandon the — what are now often labelled — “mosques of the fathers”, is said to create opportunities for fundamentalist movements such as the Salafites, who offer an alternative religious infrastructure, and for so-called “travelling imams” who are linked to international Islamic radical movements.58

Islam in the Netherlands develops constantly; new institutions arise while other institutions become less important or disappear. For example, in the last years Islamic cemeteries were founded, a new Institution for the Contact of Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid) came about in 2002 and a Master’s course for Islamic spiritual caregivers started at the Free University in Amsterdam in September 2005.

In the majority of cases, the key to the process of recognition lies with the national and local government or with particular sections of it. However, this role is by no means played out unequivocally or consistently. At certain times governments can actively encourage the formation of Muslim institutions, while at others they can adopt a neutral, legalistic point of view, delay the opening of some institutions, or put a direct block on things. The government and the policy makers want Muslims to organise themselves in a manner considered acceptable and efficient in the Netherlands, that is to say with representative organisations or in coordinating bodies with approachable spokesmen. Such an approach works on the mistaken premise that Muslims in the Netherlands form a coherent community. But in this way, the administrators hope to avoid becoming ensnared in mutual bickering, or having to deal with an amorphous mass with constantly changing leaders. At the same time they want to increase the legitimacy of their political actions.

9.3 Attitudes of the public authorities towards Muslim organisations and institutions
The Dutch authorities are interested in relations with Islamic organisations for several different reasons.

First, consultation with the representatives of Muslim organisations offers the opportunity to establish the main issues in the several Islamic communities in the Netherlands, and to reach agreement on policy proposals by means of deliberation and dialogue. This motivated Government financial support for the formation of a national institution of consultation, in which a number of umbrella organisations are represented, The Institution for the Contact of Muslims and Government. The Islam en Burgerschap (Islam and Citizenship) foundation, which develops initiatives and projects around the theme of Islam, integration and participation, is another example of a publicly funded institution. This kind of consultation and dialogue fits into the Dutch model of State and religious organisations, and Dutch consensus democracy and the dialogue-based corporatist forms of governance called the poldermodel. A visible and more or less representative organ of consultation offers the opportunity of a visible contact point in the case of terrorist incidents or arson of mosques and Islamic schools.

Second, the Government sees a central place for Islamic organisations in integration policy and, more recently, in the fight against radicalism. On the one hand, the Government is benevolent, hopeful and inclined to think that “organising religious and theological relations” with Islamic organisations can contribute to “the orientation of their members towards Dutch society and can strengthen their awareness of responsibility”. On the other hand, the Government is also directive, and wants to make an appeal to religious organisations to do all that is in their power to “make their members aware of their responsibility for our pluralistic society”. The then Minister of Urban and Integration Policy, for example, held the opinion that, in order to heighten “the effectiveness of the Government’s policy”, the Government could make use of the collaboration of religious organisations and spiritual leaders.

With such an orchestration of religious organisations on behalf of the Government’s policy, the authorities need to ask themselves again and again how this combines with the separation of Church and State and the principle of equal treatment. Yet, many Islamic organisations do have an interest in close cooperation with the Government. This is both because many governors of Islamic organisations worry about such societal problems as deprivation, radicalisation and discrimination, and because organisations have a financial interest in the recognition of authorities, for example in educational projects.

Several local authorities are trying to get a clearer understanding of Muslim organisations, their range of activities, and the way in which they do or do not contribute to policy objectives. A recent report on the societal activities and services in mosque organisations in the Netherlands noted that, when Government deals with mosque organisations purely instrumentally and mobilises these organisations as “instruments for integration”, the credibility of mosque organisations is impaired (Canatan et al., 2005: 82). Nevertheless, there are not only pitfalls, but also opportunities for further development of the relations between local authorities and Islamic organisations.

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61 See also: C. Cörüz (1996), “Vertel mij eens, wat bedoelen jullie met integratie?” Verslag met aanbevelingen en conclusies van de rondetafelbijeenkomsten rond het thema ‘De rol van moskeeën bij het integratieproces in de Nederlandse samenleving’ (“Tell me, what do you mean by integration?” Report with recommendations and conclusions of the roundtable meetings on the topic of ‘The role of mosques in the integration process into Dutch society’). Amsterdam: Stichting Bijzondere Leerstoel Islam (Foundation to establish a Professorship on Islamic Affairs).
62 This study was based on a survey among 120 Mosque Committees in The Netherlands (conducted in 2003 and 2004), followed by a more in-depth study (including qualitative interviews) in Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Nijmegen and Dordrecht (Canatan et al., 2005: 13-15). For its methodology the study drew upon an earlier study in Rotterdam about the societal role of Mosque Committees (see Canatan et al., 2003).
Part II: Policy Context

1. Perception of Muslims
Discussions about Islam and the integration of immigrants in Dutch society have become much sharper in recent years. This development of the debate is connected to recurrent issues, such as the wearing of the hijab, emancipation of women, respect and tolerance for homosexuals, freedom of speech and criticism of Islam, the role of imams and the functioning of Islamic schools. Public perceptions of Muslims and Islam have been negatively impacted by the terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001, the bombings in Madrid and London and the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004). The 2004 assassination of Van Gogh led to an outburst of violence, but the fear of Islam had already been steadily growing in the Netherlands (see Sniderman et al., 2003).

1.1 Inter-ethnic relations
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a significant section of the Dutch population has had a negative opinion about the presence of immigrants. Half of the population think that too many immigrants live in the Netherlands, and do not want to have neighbours with an immigrant background (SCP, 2005). In general, opinions about the multi-ethnic society have become more negative, and particularly opinions about Muslims.

Half of those with an immigrant background, and also half of the Turkish and Moroccan population, think that a Western lifestyle cannot be combined with an Islamic lifestyle. The native Dutch population worry most about the position of Muslim women, who do not have enough freedom in their eyes. Turks and Moroccans experience the most problems in the lack of respect for the other’s culture. Half of the Turks and one third of the Moroccans think that Dutch women have too much freedom. Three out of four native Dutch people would experience problems with a partner for their child who was of immigrant origin, but also many Turkish and Moroccan people find a native Dutch partner for their child undesirable. Turks and Moroccans are much more negative about a native Dutch partner than other minority groups (SCP, 2005).

An opinion poll in June 2004 showed that 68 per cent of the respondents felt threatened by “immigrant or Muslim young people”, 53 per cent feared a terrorist attack by Muslim terrorists in the Netherlands, and 47 per cent feared that in due time they would have to live according to Islamic rules in the Netherlands. An opinion poll by a Dutch newspaper, shortly after the turmoil around the Danish cartoons in 2006, showed that 70.7 per cent of the respondents thought that Islam was “unfriendly to women”, 55.9 per cent of the respondents thought that there was “no room for humour in Islam”, and 54 per cent thought that Islam and democracy were incompatible. Besides these acts of violence and negative public opinion towards Muslim populations, there have been some cases of discrimination involving girls who wear the headscarf. Presently a study is being conducted in the Netherlands by

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64 See Algemeen Dagblad, 18 February 2006.
65 See the yearly reports of the National Bureau against Racial Discrimination (Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van rassendiscriminatie, LBR) (English language website: http://www.lbr.nl/?node=73&PHPSESSID=4f83a9ed668ff02590895be48dca2f6d) and the National Federation of Anti Discrimination Bureaus (Landelijke Vereniging van Anti-Discriminatiebureaus en meldpunten, LVADB) (English language website: http://www.lvadb.nl/index2.html), (NB The LBR and the LVADB should merge from 1 January 2007); See also G. Grubben, Een onfortuinlijke positie. Discriminatie van moslima's in Nederland (LBR 2001); and European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Comparative Study on the collection of data to measure the extent and impact of discrimination within the United States, Canada,
researchers at the ISIM as part of a comparative project that is aimed at assessing the consequences of the various responses to September 11 and the murder of Theo Van Gogh for Muslim communities and European societies at large.\textsuperscript{66}

An important consequence of the fact that Van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch Muslim who became a radical in the Netherlands has been a change of perception of the religiosity of young Muslims. In the early 1990s, researchers assumed that young Muslims would become more secular and tolerant, and would look for less traditional forms of Islamic religiosity and practice than those of their parents (See Sunier 1996; Phalet et al. 2000). However, this perception has now changed dramatically and local authorities are now developing policies to prevent the radicalisation of Muslim young people.

The negative opinion about Muslims and Islam also affects perceptions of religious facilities such as Muslim faith-based schools in the Netherlands. This can be illustrated by looking at the ways in which newly built mosques were represented in public discourse in the 1990s. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the number of newly built mosques — mostly built by Turkish mosque committees — increased to a total number of 32 in 1995, and of these 23 had typical architectural characteristics such as domes or minarets (Dijker, 1995). These mosques were usually represented as “enrichments to the urban landscape” of Dutch towns, as “symbols of emancipation and of recognition” or as buildings which gave Muslims in the Netherlands “a profile” (see Maussen, 2004).

However, the prevailing representations of new mosques have radically changed in the last five years or so. Mosques are now no longer automatically represented as symbols of emancipation. Instead, mosques built in a “traditional” style are said to be illustrations of the failure of immigrant integration. The mosque buildings in the Netherlands are said to be “unimaginative”, “ugly” and “cheap imitations”, revealing that Muslims in the Netherlands do not care about their new societal environment and simply build “nostalgia mosques” which remind them of the “countries of origin”. These shifts in the meaning of mosque buildings are illustrative of the changes in the discourse about Islamic presence in the Netherlands (see Maussen 2004; 2005, 2006).

1.2 Political debate
The political discourse has become sharper. The most famous Dutch politician to criticise Islam is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. But Hirsi Ali is not the only politician who features prominently in the headlines of Dutch newspapers and television, because of statements on Islam. A number of right-wing politicians, such as Geert Wilders, Joost Eerdmans and Hilbrand Nawijn, also repeatedly argue that Islam is a threat to Western civilisation. This has led some politicians, notably Geert Wilders, to ask for the deportation of Moroccan young people who engaged in petty crime, saying “If they have two passports we should take back the Dutch passport and expel them to Morocco.” On other occasions Wilders has asked for the immediate deportation of all the supposed suspects of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{67}


\textsuperscript{66} Further information available on the ISIM website (\url{http://www.isim.nl}) and the Ethnobarometer website (\url{http://www.ethnobarometer.org}).

\textsuperscript{67} See, for example “Den Haag laf tegen islamitisch extremisme”, in \textit{NRC-Handelsblad}, 22 July 2005; See also the website of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (\url{http://www.geertwilders.nl}).
A number of local politicians, notably in Rotterdam, have also been very visible in the Dutch media, because of their statements on Islam. Alderman Marco Pastors of Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam)\(^{68}\) spoke out in 2002 against the establishment of mosques in a “deviating style”. According to the alderman, Islam did not recognise the separation of Church and State and “criminal Muslims used their religion to justify their crimes”\(^{69}\). Another alderman of Liveable Rotterdam, Marianne van den Anker, also wrote an essay, which was published by the city of Rotterdam, and which served to stimulate debate about Islam in Rotterdam. According to Van den Anker, “Muslims” were guilty of “gang-rapes” because they considered Western women to be “whores anyhow”, and she argued that “Muslims” were guilty of “stoning” women. According to the alderman there were seven “plagues of Islam”, including the “cult of virginity”, “hatred of homosexuals”, “honour killing” and “female circumcision” (see Maussen 2006: 116-124).\(^{70}\)

Politicians such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Geert Wilders and Marco Pastors do not stand alone in voicing their critique of Islam in public debate. A number of liberal and conservative opinion-makers have made a career in the Dutch public debate by ‘Islam-bashing’. A Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utrecht, Herman Philipse, has maintained that Muslims in the Netherlands adhere to values that are characteristic of a “tribal culture”. Because of this “tribal culture”, immigrants legitimise the use of violence and destruction. According to Philipse, Islam is thoroughly incompatible with the separation of Church and State or with “Western civilisation” and modernity in general.\(^{71}\)

Another leading figure is Afshin Ellian, an Iranian refugee who is a professor of law and a columnist of NRC Handelsblad. In a similar way to that of Hirsi Ali, Afshin Ellian positions himself as an ‘expert witness’ who fled Iran because of the tyrannical regime, and now fears the growing influence of Muslim radicalism in the Netherlands. These commentators argue that there is a need to return to the values of the Enlightenment, and that Islam constitutes a threat to secularism. Moreover, they criticise ‘multiculturalism’ and what they label ‘moral relativism’.\(^{72}\)

However, the idea that the Dutch media simply engage in ‘Muslim-bashing’ cannot be maintained. In a study on public debate in national newspapers around the assassination of Theo Van Gogh, Uitermark and Hajer conclude that “after an initial period of moral confusion

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68 The Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam) Party is regarded as the local party of the LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), the national party of Pim Fortuyn, which was founded just after Pim Fortuyn was fired as lijsttrekker (leader) of the Leebaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands) Party in spring 2002. (NB. The Liveable Netherlands Party was a populist but centrist party that tried to reproduce on the national level the overwhelming success of the local protest parties, Livable Utrecht and Livable Hilversum — first in cities across the country in the March 2002 local elections and then in the national elections a few months later.)

69 Because of these statements, Pastors was forced to step down from the Board of Mayor and Aldermen in November 2005. In 2006, Pastors launched a new right-wing populist party together with Joost Eerdmans, called Eén NL. See also “Fighting Islamophobia in a Region”, a speech by Ibrahim Spalburg, Director of the Foundation Platform of Islamic Organisations in Rijnmond (SPIOR), in The Fight against Anti-semitism and Islamophobia. Bringing Communities Together. A Summary of three Round Table Meetings (EUMC 2003: 83ff).


71 See Herman Philipse “Stop de tribalisering van Nederland”, in NRC-Handelsblad, 27/28 September 2003. Ironically, this professor was interviewed in 2003 by the French Stasi committee on laïcité as an expert on integration in the Netherlands. The members of the French committee concluded after an interview with the ‘researcher’ Philipse that there was a danger of “tribalism” in The Netherlands.

72 For discussions about the role of intellectuals in public debate about Islam, see Prins (2004); Van Bruinessen (2006); Peters (2006).
and a search for new meaning-giving narratives, there was a marked rise in the appreciation of several structural problems that face migrants in the Netherlands” (2005: 22).

Since the 2002 parliamentary elections, the Dutch Government has shifted gears to embark on a tougher ‘integration policy’, placing increasing emphasis on native norms, values and behaviour and on disciplining ‘the Other’. The ‘neo-realism’ that has informed this shift has been accompanied by fierce criticism of Islam and what many people believe to be the Muslim way of life. A review the process of institutionalisation must soberly conclude that, in fact, the heated debates about Islam in the Netherlands have come rather late in the day. The national public debates only took place after many institutions were already established and recognised. In many cases, too, the institutionalisation of Muslim organisations are only indirectly relevant to what is in fact happening, not least because the debates are dominated by abstract and ideological views, and also because they take little account of the limitations on the power of society to oppose the establishment of Muslim institutions, assuming that it wanted to. The fact is that Muslims only make use of common, hence universally valid, constitutional rights — including freedom of religion and the principle of equality — which are held to be of the highest importance in the Netherlands.
2. Integration policy and governance of diversity

2.1 Governance of religious diversity and State–Church relations

The Netherlands has been familiar with religious diversity for centuries. Before World War II, and in the 1950s, the forces of ‘pillarisation’ produced a society in which religion and ideology were among the central social determinants, and in which citizens organised themselves accordingly (see, for example, Lijphart, 1975; Van Schendelen, 1984). The social groupings based on religion or a philosophy of life formed ‘pillars’; these were more or less closed communities, within which all social life took place, from the cradle to the grave. Each pillar had its own institutions, including hospitals, daily and weekly newspapers, broadcasting networks, schools, universities, housing associations, trade unions, small business associations, political parties, and even sports clubs and choirs. There was virtually no interaction between the pillars, except right at the top, where accommodation between them was arranged and where the political leaders were in close consultation with each other, settled imminent conflicts and protected their own interests.

In the developing welfare State, pillarised organisations were closely involved in the formulation and implementation of Government policy, not least in the allocation of social goods and services to the citizens, which justified their existence. This state of affairs was firmly anchored not only in social and political practice, but also in legislation. Although counter-forces of ‘depillarisation’ were present during the development of this pillarised system, they had limited influence. Not until the 1960s, simultaneously with the Churches’ loss of influence and the growth of secularisation, did the pillarised organisations lose their dominant position and did their ‘natural’ involvement with policy recede. Legislation was accordingly amended on a number of points, with the 1983 revision of the Constitution forming at least a provisional milestone. The new Constitution brought to an end a number of Government commitments, particularly financial ones, to the Churches, and the separation of Church and State entered a new phase (for an overview, see Van Bijsterveld 2005).

The separation of Church and State is not only based on a number of legal arrangements, but is also informed by a specific ‘spirit of the law’, which has been extremely important with regard to the incorporation of Islam as a minority religion. Stephen Monsma and Christopher Soper (1997) describe the Dutch model of Church and State relations as one of “principled pluralism”. The Dutch model is based first and foremost on the principle of equal treatment. Equal treatment applies both to individual citizens and to their religious beliefs, duties and practices, and to the different collective manifestations of religion or ideology, for instance in the form of religious and ideological organisations.

Second, the Dutch model starts off from the assumption that a democratic public sphere consists of a plurality of religious and non-religious denominations and ideologies. Instead of claiming that the State should itself establish and maintain a ‘neutral’ public sphere — as is assumed in the French Republican model for instance — the Dutch model is based on the assumption that so-called “neutral organisations” are not truly neutral “but are yet another richting, or direction, equally legitimate but no more legitimate than a host of other religious and nonreligious philosophies or directions” (Monsma and Soper, 1997: 80).

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73 For recent overviews of Dutch immigrant incorporation policies in English, see Penninx and Vermeulen (2000); Entzinger (2003); Penninx, Garcés-Marscareñas et al. (2005); Penninx (2005); Doomernik (2005).
Third, in the Dutch model, religious and ideological associations are seen as valuable elements in the civil society. In principle, then, the State wants to approach these associations with goodwill, because these organisations personify organised citizens, who are willing and able to organise their own life, and such organisations can function as counterweights to the dominant position of the State and its institutions.

Fourth, the Dutch model attributes a central importance to the freedom of choice of individual citizens. This implies that individual citizens should have several meaningful options from which to choose. For example, in the domain of education they can choose from a number of different school types and are not obliged to send their children to one single type of State school. Moreover, “if religion is to be fully free, Government must take certain positive steps to accommodate it so that religion, along with secular beliefs, can in practice be freely exercised” (Monsma and Soper, 1997: 81). However, the importance of individual freedom of choice also implies that citizens are protected by the State if they decide to abandon their religious beliefs or step out of their religious community. This model of Church and State relations enshrined in the law and its spirit have been of key importance to the incorporation of Islam into Dutch society.

2.3 Immigrant integration policies
Until the mid-1970s, policies towards labour migrants in the Netherlands were primarily about the recruitment of new ‘guest-workers’, the regulation of working and residence permits, and the establishment of basic facilities for guest-workers (such as housing, medical care and leisure time activities). The underlying conceptual framework was based on what Han Entzinger has called the “myth of a temporary sojourn” (see Entzinger, 2003). State responsibility was minimal. Employers were held responsible for providing housing or medical care, while other forms of care were predominantly provided by volunteer associations.

On the other hand, the temporary guest-workers were, especially from the late 1960s and early 1970s, encouraged to “maintain and develop their cultural identity”. Policies were primarily intended to avoid a further integration of guest-workers into Dutch society, to prevent a loss of “moral orientation” and facilitate the “re-integration” of temporary workers and their families into their societies of origin upon their return. Within this perspective, facilities were established for religious practice, but also for language courses in the mother tongue. When it became clear in the late 1970s that Muslims were no longer temporary guest-workers but immigrants who were settling permanently in Dutch society, the Dutch government began to make a number of legal and institutional provisions to guarantee the equal treatment of Islam as one of the minority religions in the Netherlands.

Around the beginning of the 1980s there was a shift towards immigrant incorporation policies, which were elaborated in the policy framework of the Ethnic Minorities’ Policy. Local and national level policies on minorities aimed at encouraging the integration of newcomers by recognising their status as permanent settlers in the Netherlands.

74 See Maussen (2006), chapter 2.
75 It was typical of the Dutch approach that a thorough study was made as early as 1983 to see what legal obstacles existed that might prevent the equal treatment of new ethnic and religious minorities. See H. Beune and A. Hessels, Minderheid – Minder Recht. Een inventarisatie van bepalingen in de Nederlandse wet- en regelgeving waarin onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen allochtonen en autochtonen (1983). See also Penninx, (2005).
in Dutch society were seen as belonging to ethnic minorities, which faced serious deprivations in important areas such as language, education and access to the labour market.

Minority policies were not only targeted at labour immigrants, but also at other underprivileged groups, such as post-colonial immigrants (Moluccans, Surinamese and Antilleans), and Gypsies and Travellers. Minority policies were, first and foremost, based on welfare policy, meaning that the process of minority formation and marginalisation was to be prevented through general policies of integration in different societal spheres (notably, the labour market, education and housing). Policy-makers argued that some groups needed extra support to compensate for group-specific setbacks.

Integration and more equal participation of newcomers also demanded reforms in the political sphere, which were encouraged through the establishment of consultation structures for ethnic minorities at the local and national level, and by granting active and passive voting rights to foreign residents in local elections (introduced in 1985) (see for example Penninx, 2005). Moreover, the Dutch Nationality Code was modified in 1986, making it easier for alien immigrants to obtain Dutch citizenship. The idea of a group-based emancipation process combined with the emphasis on full equal treatment — especially in the legal domain — led to what leading expert Rinus Pennix has called “multicultural policies avant la lettre” (2005: 4). The phrase “integration with the maintenance of cultural identity” continued to float around in public and policy discourse until the late 1980s. Moreover, the idea of group-based emancipation of the new ethnic minorities could hook into the discourses on ‘pillarisation’, allowing some people to argue that multiculturalism was engrained in the Dutch socio-political model of integration and management of cultural and religious diversity.

Also in the early 1980s, a process of accommodation and institutionalisation of Islam began in the Netherlands. In the legal domain a number of measures were taken in the 1980s to allow for Islamic practice and rituals: starting with an allowance for ritual slaughtering on a par with Jewish rituals (in 1977), allowing for the call to prayer on a par with the ringing of church bells (in 1988), the recognition of Muslim festivals and dietary rules (notably in the armed services and prisons), and the adjustment of legislation on funerary practices to allow for Islamic traditions (see Rath et al., 2001: 52ff).

The establishment of houses of worship was, in the 1980s, among the most basic and urgent needs for religious practice among Muslim newcomers. However, Islam in the Netherlands has not been able to benefit from the kind of subsidies that were made available for Christian churches until the mid-1970s. This was due to the fact that Muslim newcomers arrived during a time when Dutch society was rapidly secularising. This in turn triggered demands for a clearer separation of Church and State, which implied the dismantling of financial ties between State and religious organisations, and notably of the subventions for the construction and maintenance costs of religious buildings and for the salaries of religious personnel. One mosque was built in Almelo in 1975 with a subsidy that resulted from an existing general regulation for “church buildings” issued in 1962. Moreover, between 1976 and 1983 Muslims in the Netherlands could receive some public support for the establishment and refurbishment of prayer rooms and houses of worship. These subsidies were in part motivated in terms of the “moral duty” of Dutch society and the Dutch State towards the ‘guest-workers’, who were
entitled to have adequate provisions allowing them to “develop and maintain their cultural identity” whilst temporarily sojourning in Dutch society.\footnote{Moreover, there have been subsidies for the establishment of mosques for the post-colonial Moluccan families who had been soldiers in the Royal Dutch Indian Army. These mosques were built in 1986 and 1990. State support was motivated in terms of a “moral duty” of the former colonial State towards the Moluccan families.}

In the 1980s, the Government was advised by two different consulting committees to develop a new regulation for subsidies for the establishment of houses of worship. Both committees argued that it was appropriate to help Muslims to “catch up” with the more established religious minorities, and that the State should provide compensation for arrears of financially weak communities in order to change the \textit{de facto} unequal conditions for Islamic practice. However, partly because of the constitutional reform of 1983, the Government never took this advice. Nevertheless, local governments have on the whole been supportive of the establishment of mosques in the 1980s and 1990s, even though they have not given direct public subventions (see Landman, 1992; Hampsink, 1992; Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1995; Rath \textit{et al.}, 2001).

Since the 1990s, immigrant incorporation policies have been redirected. Policies continued to be firmly grounded in general welfare policy, which intended to fight arrears in education and labour market participation among the immigrant populations. But in the domain of culture more emphasis was placed on the need for more cultural assimilation and the encouragement of individual newcomers and their descendants to acquire the skills needed for successful emancipation in Dutch society.\footnote{These objectives were laid down in the Contourennota integratiebeleid etnische minderheden (1994) (see Entzinger, 2003: 72ff).}

In the mid-1990s ‘good citizenship’ and ‘civic integration’ (\textit{inburgering}) became new key policy concepts. This implied not only that newcomers needed to acquire specific skills — notably the Dutch language and knowledge of Dutch society — in order to allow for a successful participation in Dutch society and the labour market, but also that integration required that individual newcomers would make an effort to genuinely integrate into Dutch society.\footnote{See Parliamentary Enquiry Committee (Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid), 5 volumes, 2004.} In 1998 the new Law on the Civic Integration of Newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, WIN) made civic integration courses compulsory for new immigrants, and in the same year a policy was introduced that was aimed at bettering the position of minorities in the sphere of employment (SAMEN Wet or Act for the Stimulation of Labour Market Participation) (see Guiraudon \textit{et al.}, 2005; Doomernik, 2005: 33). Besides, the lenient policy practices that had been introduced in 1992, which allowed immigrants to obtain dual nationality, were changed in 1997 into a more restrictive naturalisation policy practice (Entzinger, 2003: 67; Penninx, 2005).

The economic recession, which set in during the late 1990s and early 21st Century, once again put the overrepresentation of immigrants in statistics on unemployment and school dropout high on the public agenda. Moreover, the public debate about the failures of Dutch integration policies, which followed the publication in 2000 of an essay by Paul Scheffer entitled “The Multicultural Tragedy”, has more and more made it appear as if all policies up until then had been based on naïve and ineffective measures. The levels of socio-economic, geographical and cultural segregation were said to be far deeper in Dutch cities than anyone dared to say. A special parliamentary commission investigated Dutch integration policies in 2004.\footnote{Despite the fact that the report concluded that there had been considerable successes in many domains,}
the prevailing image remains that of a total failure. Building on this image, the present Government of Christian Democrats (Christen-Democratisch Appel Party, CDA), Liberal Right (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) and Liberal Left (Democrats ’66, Democraten ’66, D66) pushes for more restrictive policies towards immigration. Moreover, several policies have been developed to make integration of newcomers more mandatory and demanding, also in the domain of culture (ICMPD, 2005).

In a turbulent period of national and international debates, a new official Government policy was introduced in 2003, called the “Integration Policy New Style”, which is intended to encourage common citizenship based on common norms and values (Penninx et al., 2005). The Government suggested introducing a system by which it could measure the cultural distance (or nearness) of immigrants vis-à-vis Dutch society (Doomernik, 2005: 35). Islam plays a key role in the ways in which the cultural and religious background of immigrant populations is being framed as a potential obstacle to “immigrant integration”. 79 More recently, the Minister for Immigration and Integration, Rita Verdonk, has argued that the time when public authorities merely engaged with Muslim association by “cosy tea-drinking” was over, that it was time that autochthonous populations and newcomers engaged in dialogue, and that they should not be afraid to mutually criticise one another. 80

79 This becomes clear in a recent film that was made by the Ministry for Immigration and Integration, which serves to inform potential newcomers about the Netherlands. The film includes a number of stereotypical images of the Netherlands as “a free society” and tries to show how these “values” might conflict with “the values of immigrants”. Immigrants are informed that “violence”, “female circumcision” and “honour killing” are not allowed in the Netherlands. The film also shows gay men kissing and a bare-breasted woman coming out of the sea. These images serve to inform newcomers about what they can expect when coming to the Netherlands. Critics have said the film is aimed at discouraging foreigners — and Muslims in particular — from coming to the Netherlands.

3. Administrative structures

3.1 The local authorities

In the Netherlands the municipal council is elected every four years. The city is governed by a Commission of Mayor and Aldermen. Whereas the Aldermen are accountable to the municipal council, the Mayor is established by the Queen. The City Hall is responsible for the overall policies of the city, while the City Districts (which exist in Amsterdam and Rotterdam) have power over affairs that concern their district only. The administrative structure of the city districts copies the structure of the municipality, consisting of a city district council, a board of city district aldermen presided by the city district president. The city district has a relatively important role in the implementation of welfare policies and in the implementation of urban development programs.

Local authorities are concerned with Muslims and Islam in many different ways. They are, in a lot of concrete situations, important actors in shaping the opportunities and limitations for Islamic religious practice in the Netherlands. In their study of the institutionalisation of Islam, Rath et al. (2001) conclude “The local government is the pivot on which everything hinges”.

Local government is involved in Islam for three reasons:

First, local authorities have, in general, the responsibility for urban facilities, for town planning and preservation of order and security, for the environment, and for the reduction of nuisance. From this line of approach, local authorities get to deal with applications for the building of mosques or Islamic cemeteries, and with applications for the founding of Islamic schools. Municipalities have to see to it that prayer rooms and Qur’an schools measure up to the requirements of fire safety, and that rules for public demonstrations as laid down in the Public Demonstrations Act (Wet op de Openbare Manifestaties) are respected when there is the call for prayer (see Rath et al. 2001: 53). Over and above that, local government has the general responsibility for the supply and spatial dispersal of urban facilities, whether they be playing gardens, schools, sports facilities or cemeteries. In municipal development plans the needs of the population, which include the need for religious facilities, are taken into account.

Second, local authorities pursue a policy that is directed towards the welfare of the inhabitants of the city, and towards their chances and opportunities in employment, education, culture and recreation. Moreover, for the Muslim population, the integration policy focuses on civic integration and the fight against deprivation. Many Muslims belong to the social underclass that is dependent on public support and the supply of facilities in the neighbourhood or district (Snel et al., 2005). In neighbourhoods and districts, mosque organisations are often an important link between municipal institutions (community centres, neighbourhood policemen and welfare workers) and the non-native population. The local authorities try to reach the distinct target groups of welfare policies and minorities’ policies via mosque organisations, for example by organising information meetings in the mosque, on care for the elderly or education. Representatives of Muslim self-organisations function in different ways as contact persons on a local level, for example by taking part in advice committees or projects that stimulate citizens’ participation and social cohesion.

Third, local governments try — especially in times like these — to pursue a policy that is aimed at developing a robust democratic society, in which the behaviour of citizens is based on decency, non-violence and mutual respect. In recent years, Islam has become a central
issue in discussions on the radicalisation of young people, the emancipation of non-native women, respect for the constitutional State and (the absence of any) discrimination based on origin, faith or sexual orientation. Particularly since the second half of the 1990s, the emphasis in national integration policy has been placed on the idea that immigrants have themselves an individual responsibility for their own integration and civic integration. The national Government holds the opinion that everybody should feel responsible for society and for the people who are part of that society. Especially since the murder of Van Gogh, and the subsequent attacks on mosques and Islamic schools, several municipalities have developed initiatives to emphasise the shared loyalty to the city and to Dutch society, and to give Muslim organisations an important role in this.

Although the local authorities have many reasons to be concerned about Islam and the Muslim population, there are many examples of policy that is directed towards aspects of Islamic religious needs and facilities. The city of Rotterdam, for example, pursued a local policy for the construction of mosques between 1992 and 2002, and other municipalities too have tried to make an inventory and to regulate the housing situation of mosques.\(^{81}\) More recently, a number of municipalities try to regulate the availability of Islamic cemeteries.\(^{82}\) Several municipalities have made an inventory of the activities that mosques organise, and have suggested how local policies with regard to the social role of mosque organisations could be modelled.\(^{83}\)

There are a large number of initiatives in Dutch municipalities for inter-religious dialogues, debates, festivities during the month of Ramadan and urban discussions.\(^{84}\) Since the attacks in the United States and the assassination of Van Gogh, many municipalities have felt the need for a more mindful and systematic policy for Islam and the Muslim population. In addition, many Muslim organisations are busy defining their position, activities and role in local society.

The stark increase of initiatives and the need for a more sensible policy is further stimulated by two developments:

First, the national Government has issued several policy memorandums and proposals on Islam in the Netherlands in the last years. These concern, among other things, the schooling of imams, the relations between freedom of speech and freedom of religion,\(^{85}\) the supervision of Islamic schools, and the development of policy with regard to Islamic radicalism. This is partly research and policy that the national government itself sets up, initiates and executes. The Social and Cultural Planning Office, for example, has studied by order of the Lower House and the Minister of Integration and Foreign Affairs the diversity and changes in

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\(^{81}\) See, besides the policy memoranda “Moskeeën in Rotterdam” (1992) and “Huisvesting van moskeeën. Eindrapport Rotterdams moskeebeleid” (2002), also the report “Moskeeën en Mandirs in Den Haag” (1993) and “Gebedsruimten in Den Haag” (Regioplan, 2005), or the “Moskeenotities” of Utrecht Municipality, from 1982 and 1992.

\(^{82}\) See, for example, “Wat is uw laatste wens. Een verkennend onderzoek naar de behoefte, wensen en ideeën m.b.t. islamitische begraafgelegenheden onder Amsterdanse moslims” (2004).

\(^{83}\) See, for example: “De maatschappelijke rol van de Rotterdamse moskeeën” (Rotterdam, 2003); “Laat het van twee kanten komen. Eindrapportage van een verkenning (quick scan) van de maatschappelijke rol van moskeeën in Amsterdam” (Amsterdam, 2004); and “Een klop op de deur. Moskeeën en vrijwillige inzet” (Utrecht, 2005).

\(^{84}\) See, for example, [www.ramadanfestival.nl](http://www.ramadanfestival.nl) and [www.islamenburgerschap.nl](http://www.islamenburgerschap.nl).

\(^{85}\) See the policy memorandum “Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving” of the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations) (2004).
religious orientations of Muslims in the Netherlands (see above). The national Government also developed policy proposals for the establishment of an imam training programme, and plans to strengthen the resistance against radicalisation of Muslim young people. A large part of national policy is developed in collaboration with local authorities, and municipalities are encouraged to develop their own initiatives to combat ethnic tensions and radicalisation.

Second, many governors and policy-makers of Dutch municipalities have developed a sense of urgency since the murder of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch Muslim. Many Aldermen wonder what goes on in the hearts of the Muslims in their city. Additionally, politicians wonder whether the Muslim communities are equipped to counter the radicalisation of Muslim young people and whether there is a wide generation gap within Muslim organisations in the Netherlands. At the same time, local governors do realise that a peaceful society is only possible if there is sufficient mutual respect and understanding and if citizens do not translate their mutual differences of opinion and cultural diversity into violence, discrimination and hate. In that light there are also many initiatives to bridge the gap between sections of the population, to strengthen social cohesion and to counter segregation in the cities.

Local authorities have, especially since 2004, been developing new policies to prevent further radicalisation of both Muslim and right-wing youth. Several municipalities, particularly Rotterdam and Amsterdam, have tried in the last two years — 2004 and 2005 — to develop action programmes that must lead to a strengthening of the social cohesion in local society, and to a better resistance on the part of youngsters who are susceptible to the ideology of radical Islamic movements. In Amsterdam, the municipality carried out several studies on “ethnic tensions” at primary and secondary schools. Moreover, the fight against discrimination and prejudice is also part of the new “anti-radicalisation” policies, which are being developed by municipalities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht (see Maussen, 2006). Amsterdam presented a plan to prevent radicalism and encourage mutual understanding, called “We the people of Amsterdam” (Wij Amsterdammers) in January 2005.

Besides attempts to increase the possibilities of surveillance and control, there are also projects to enhance social cohesion, and notably to mitigate feelings of exclusion and discrimination among Muslim young people. In Amsterdam, for example, a key element of the campaign against radicalisation is the fight against discrimination and intolerance. In the district of De Baarsjes the city district council and mosque committees joined together to establish a special centre to register complaints about discrimination of Muslims. Those who were involved argue that this special bureau was a way of lowering the threshold for Muslims to register discrimination.

The Institute for Multicultural Development, FORUM, is developing a comprehensive programme to heighten the resistance against forces of radicalisation, especially in local society. According to the government, shared citizenship and active participation must be strengthened, so that “the Dutch society becomes a mutual project of native Dutch and migrants”. The Muslim community and especially the existing Islamic organisations could and should play a part in the “supply of counter-information, the heightening of the resistance against arguments and convictions of the radical Islam, and in the mobilisation of

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86 See Phalet & Ter Wal (eds) Moslim in Nederland, 6 volumes (SCP, 2004).
87 See “Moslims: eigen meldpunt discriminatie”, in De Volkskrant, 7 October 2005.
counter-forces in the direct environment of the youngsters who are susceptible to forces of radicalisation”.
PART III: CITY SELECTION

1. Amsterdam

1.1 Population and Islamic organisations and institutions
The city of Amsterdam has a total population of around 750,000 inhabitants. In 2004, Amsterdam had about 63,000 inhabitants of Moroccan descent and about 38,000 inhabitants of Turkish descent. These are the two largest Muslim communities in Amsterdam. Furthermore, there are Muslims among the 71,000 ethnic Surinamese, 5,000 Egyptians and 5,000 Pakistanis who live in Amsterdam.89

In 2002, there were 44 mosques,90 eight Islamic primary schools and one Islamic secondary school in Amsterdam.91 The Schools Inspectorate concluded that seven of these Islamic primary schools performed well in promoting social cohesion and integration in Dutch society. The As Siddieq school, founded in 1989, was the only school that, according to the Inspectorate, needed to search for “a better balance between, on the one hand passing on identity-bounded norms and values, and on the other hand, norms that ease the participation of pupils in Dutch society”.

There are different types of Muslim organisations in Amsterdam: mosque organisations, youth organisations, women’s organisations, umbrella organisations and Muslim cultural organisations:

In 2000, there were 20 Turkish religious organisations in Amsterdam. Of these, seven belonged to the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (TICF), which is affiliated to the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet); three belonged to the Foundation Islamic Centre for the Netherlands (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland); ten were affiliated to the Milli Görüş movement; and three represented the Alevi Turks (Van Heelsum, 2000: 7-9).

In 2001, there were 30 Moroccan Muslim organisations in Amsterdam. Several organisations belong to the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (UMMON) (Van Heelsum, 2001: 7-8). Currently, there is also the Urban Moroccan Council and a Union of Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam and Surroundings (UMMAO).

Besides these official organisations, new initiatives are constantly being developed by young citizens of Amsterdam, such as the campaign “Are you afraid of me?” and also the so-called “Ramadan Festival”.92

1.2 Policies concerning the Muslim population
The city of Amsterdam is administered by a Board of Mayor and Aldermen. Between 2002 and 2006, the municipal government was composed of a coalition of Social Democrats

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91 In total there were 190 primary schools in Amsterdam in 2004. 4 per cent of the school-going children in Amsterdam attend a Muslim faith-based school. Of the children with a Turkish or Moroccan ethnic background, 10 per cent attend Muslim faith-based schools, 37 per cent attend Christian faith-based schools and 52 per cent attend public schools (GA, O+S 2004: 19).
92 See http://www.benjebangvoornij.nl and http://www.ramadanfestival.nl/
(PvdA) and Liberal Right (VVD). At present (since April 2006) the municipal government is composed of a coalition of Social Democrats (PvdA) and the Green Left (Groen Links).

The city is divided into 15 city districts. The city districts with a large Muslim population include De Baarsjes, Geuzenveld/Slotermeer, Oud-West, Oost-Watergraafsmeer, Slotervaart, Bos en Lommer and Osdorp.

In 2003, the Amsterdam municipal view on integration, which was adopted later by the municipal council, was explained in a policy memorandum.\(^{93}\) The point of departure for the Amsterdam approach was the idea that diversity and migration belong to the urban character of the city. The municipal government should focus on the civic integration of newcomers, the promotion of integration, and the supply of facilities that are geared to diverse populations. Furthermore, the municipality of Amsterdam did not want to restrict discussion on integration to the field of newcomers and immigrants, but also wanted to include all inhabitants of Amsterdam. The religious practice of Muslims was seen as a civil right upon which they could act within the boundaries of the law.

A dramatic event that concerned Muslims in the capital city was the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, by a radicalised Amsterdam Muslim of Moroccan descent. After the murder, an analysis was made of the “conflict potential” in the city. The municipality developed an extensive action programme, entitled “We the people of Amsterdam” (Wij Amsterdammers). This action programme was aimed at combating terrorism, resisting radicalisation, and preventing polarisation between population groups.\(^ {94}\) The starting point of the programme is to develop democratic citizenship, to make existing norms and rules of behaviour explicit, to combat discrimination and exclusion, to stimulate economic independence, and to strengthen the identification with the city of Amsterdam.\(^ {95}\) In the Amsterdam approach, it is assumed that strengthening — not constraining — democracy is the best way to combat extremism. It is true that the municipality wants to figure out whether it is possible to forbid some utterances of extremist ideas, but true constitutional principles as equality before the law should not come off worst in a new “war on extremism”.

Within the framework of the action programme “We the people of Amsterdam”, the municipality has paid a great deal of attention to supporting projects that contribute to the development of Muslim communities. The city has initiated the development of administrative networks by organising a conference on the societal role of mosques in April 2005. Still, in comparison with Rotterdam Amsterdam seems to be only at the very early stages of further institutionalising the contacts between municipal authorities and representatives of local Muslim organisations. The municipality has also published a number of studies on facilities for Islamic religious practice, such as a study on the housing of minority religious practice (including mosques) (DRO, 2002 and 2004) and a study on the needs for Muslim cemeteries in the city (2004).

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\(^{95}\) *Wij Amsterdammers* (GA, January 2005: 6).
1.3 Recommendations

There are several arguments in favour of the selection of Amsterdam for inclusion in the OSI monitoring project “Muslims in the EU: Cities Reports”. Amsterdam is the biggest city in the Netherlands and has a substantial Muslim population. Moreover, especially since the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, Muslim communities and the municipal approach have attracted a great deal of attention of the national and international press. Developments and policies in Amsterdam are widely seen as exemplary, both for the Netherlands and for other cities in Western Europe.96

Especially since 2004, the municipal government has initiated a great number of projects and studies concerning issues such as inter-ethnic relations, discrimination and radicalisation. The Mayor, Job Cohen, has repeatedly argued that the municipal approach towards Islam and Muslim communities should be based on principles such as democratic citizenship, equal treatment and inclusion, an approach that is colloquially known as “keeping things together” (‘de boel bij elkaar houden’). The project “We the people of Amsterdam”, which has been developed and implemented since autumn 2004, might constitute an interesting focus point for a comparative study on local policies concerning Islam.

There are also several Muslim platforms and Muslim organisations that represent the full range of ethnic groups in the Netherlands (including Surinamese, Pakistani, Turkish and Moroccan). Finally, there are now also several prominent local politicians in Amsterdam with a Muslim background, such as Ahmed Aboutaleb (municipal alderman) and Ahmed Marcouch (chairman of the city district of Slotervaart).

The situation of Muslim communities and local policies in Amsterdam has been documented in a number of recent studies. Maussen (2006) gives an overview of local policies towards Islam in four domains (religious facilities, Muslim organisations, integration policy and anti-radicalisation policies), and places recent developments in a historical perspective. Tillie and Slootman (forthcoming 2006) discuss the results of a recent study on radicalisation among Muslims in Amsterdam. Moreover, there are several thorough studies carried out in Amsterdam in the past six years on the political participation of immigrants, local ethnic organisations and trust among the immigrant population (see: Fennema and Tillie, 2004; Vermeulen, 2005; Berger (forthcoming)).

One interesting approach may be compare the Amsterdam case to the Rotterdam case (see section III.2), in order to deconstruct the idea of a ‘Dutch model’ and to see differences and similarities between these two Dutch cities. The comparison of these two Dutch cities would then provide an interesting starting point for a comparison with other European cities.

An argument against selecting Amsterdam could be the size of the city, the government structure (including the differences in terms of policy approach between city districts) and the difficulty for researchers who are not familiar with the city to give a good overview of key issues (given the size and diversity of the Muslim population). It would be good to combine an in-depth study of one or two city districts, such as De Baarsjes, Oud-West or Slotervaart, with an analysis of the policies and developments at the municipal level.

Particularly recommended is an in-depth study of the city districts De Baarsjes and Slotervaart. In 2006, the total population of De Baarsjes was 34,247, of which 36.3 per cent were of non-Western immigrant origin. The city district has developed several initiatives in the past years concerning the Muslim population, including the establishment of a special centre where Muslims can file complaints about discrimination, a so-called “contract with society” and “a protocol to prevent extremism” which has been drafted by the city district together with several Mosque Committees (on this see Maussen 2006). In addition, there is ongoing discussion on the construction of a large purpose built mosque in the district, called the “Westermosque” (see Lindo 1999, Sunier 2006).

Another city district that would be recommended to cover is Slotervaart. In 2006, the total population of this city district was 44,227, of which 41.4 per cent were of non-Western immigrant origin. Since March 2006, the president of this city district is a Muslim of Moroccan descent, Mohammed Marcouch (Labour, PvdA).

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2. Rotterdam

2.1 Population and Islamic organisations and institutions
Rotterdam has a population of around 600,000 inhabitants. The number of Muslims in Rotterdam is around 80,000 people, or about 13 per cent of the total population. Around 50 per cent of the Muslim population have a Turkish background, 25 per cent have a Moroccan background and 25 per cent have another background, such as Surinamese, Bosnian, Indonesian or Pakistani (GR, 2004).

The number of prayer houses in Rotterdam increased rapidly at the beginning of the 1980s. In 1979, there were five mosques, in 1982 there were already 13 mosques, and in 1987 the number increased to 28 (Landman, 1992: 290; GR, 1987). From 1992 the number of mosques decreased from 40 to 30, but then increased to 36 in 2002.

The first Muslim primary school in Rotterdam, the Al Ghazali School, was founded in 1988 and a year later the Ibn-I Sina School opened its doors. In 2000, three new Muslim primary schools, which were united in the Foundation Islamic Education Group in the Netherlands, took off. The first Islamic secondary school, the Ibn Ghaldoen, was founded in the same year. In 2003, the Islamic branch of the Rotterdam Schools Community, “The Unity” (De Eenheid), was founded (GR, 2004: 51). Nowadays, there are also two Islamic universities established in Rotterdam and Schiedam: the Islamic University of Rotterdam (IUR), which was founded in Rotterdam in 1997, and the Islamic University of Europe (IUE), which was founded in Schiedam in 2001. Both institutes aspire to offer training in Islamic theology, in religious assistance and in Arabic language and culture.

Finally, there are several other Islamic facilities in Rotterdam. There is a special clinic for ‘Muslim circuncisions’, for example. And there are facilities for Islamic funerals and burials: the Crooswijk Municipal Cemetery and the Southern Cemetery.

The first Islamic organisations in Rotterdam were mosque organisations that tried to meet the needs of Muslim immigrants for prayer rooms, religious education and contact (Canatan, 2001: 215). In the 1980s, the process of organisation formation accelerated among Turkish Muslims. Several movements and national umbrella organisations started up that were connected among themselves and had contact with foreign sister organisations (such as Milli Görüş) or the Turkish Government.

At the end of the 1980s, an initiative arose to found a platform for Muslim organisations, and this led in 1988 to the formation of the Foundation Platform of Islamic Organisations in Rijnmond (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond or SPIOR). This platform was very influential in Rotterdam in the 1990s. In 1996, most Turkish organisations left SPIOR and decided to promote their interests in their own umbrella organisation. Alevi organisations had also been excluded from the platform and have instead found a home in the Platform for Foreigners in Rijnmond (PBR).

2.2 Policies concerning the Muslim population
The city of Rotterdam is administered by a Board of Mayor and Aldermen. Between 2002 and 2006, the municipal government was composed of a coalition of Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam), the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberal Right (VVD). At

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98 See www.rotterdam.nl
present (since April 2006) the municipal government is composed of a coalition of Social Democrats (PvdA) and Christian Democrats (CDA) and Liberal Right (VVD). The city is divided into 13 city districts. City districts with a substantial Muslim population include (among others) Charlois, Delfshaven, Feijenoord and Kralingen-Crooswijk.

Rotterdam is probably one of the first cities in Europe that has tried to develop a municipal policy on mosque establishment. This policy, which was aimed at improving and regulating the housing situation of Islamic places of worship, was developed in the late 1980s and implemented in the 1990s (see Maussen, 2004; GR, 1992 and GR, 2002). Since 1988 the municipal government has also supported the establishment of the Muslim platform organisation SPIOR, set up to defend the interests of Muslim associations, to develop projects for the Muslim population and to function as an interlocutor for municipal authorities.

The municipal government that came to power in 2002 placed integration policies high on their agenda. Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam) had (also thanks to Pim Fortuyn, who was heading the list of candidates) achieved a major electoral victory in part because of a political discourse including criticism of the existing integration policies, the multicultural society and the “Islamisation of Dutch culture”. In the new policy programme of 2002, an ambitious approach was developed to deal with problems of security, liveability, illegality, lessened social cohesion, and the inflow of underprivileged and immigrant people. The lack of social cohesion was one of the biggest problems, and the Rotterdam authorities wanted to do their best to improve social cohesion and integration, among other things by strengthening the bonding of the Rotterdam citizens with their city.

Between 2002 and 2006, Islam was frequently mentioned in public and political debate in Rotterdam as a major obstacle for integration policy and as the source of all kinds of societal problems. Municipal aldermen and municipal councillors were highly visible in the Dutch media with their statements on Islam and with far-reaching policy proposals and ideas, such as a ban on the establishment of mosques in an “out of the ordinary” building style. Governors and politicians left also an express mark on debates on Islam, by claiming that Muslims in Rotterdam were guilty of “gang-rape”, by stating that religious communities were not be allowed to diverge from “our Jewish-Christian-Humanist leading culture” or by claiming that Muslims “used their religion to justify their crimes”. Many ideas appeared to be incompatible with the Dutch constitutional State, with the principle of equality before the law, and with the separation of Church and State.

Between 2003 and 2005, a major project was carried out in Rotterdam, named “Islam and Integration”. This project consisted of a number of publications on the situation of Muslims in Rotterdam, expert meetings and a series of public debates at the city district and at the municipal level. Inter alia, the project has resulted in a kind of “code of conduct” for the

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99 The Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam) Party is regarded as the local party of the LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn), the national party of Pim Fortuyn, which was founded just after Pim Fortuyn was fired as lijsttrekker (leader) of the Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands) Party in spring 2002.

100 Het nieuwe elan van Rotterdam …en zo gaan we dat doen and Sociale integratie in de moderne Rotterdamse samenleving (GR, 2003).

101 See: Maussen (2006) pp.116-121; pp 131-138; See also: Marianne van den Anker (2005) "Geloof is (g)een privé-zaak [Religion is (not) a private matter], an essay published by the municipality of Rotterdam; Marco Pastors (2005) "Scheiding van kerk en staat" [Separation of State and Church], an essay published by the municipality of Rotterdam; See also the statement by Marianne van den Anker in a newspaper article in Trouw, of 11 November 2005; and the statement by Marco Pastors in an article in the newspaper NRC Handelsblad of 9 November 2005.
citizens of Rotterdam — called the “Rotterdam Code” — and in a great number of publications (some of which are available in English).102

In the months following the murder of Van Gogh, an action programme against radicalisation was developed in Rotterdam, “Participate or Stay Behind. Action programme against radicalisation and for chances for the people of Rotterdam”, which was presented in February 2005. The Rotterdam approach has three objectives: to prevent radicalisation, to keep an eye on persons who do become radicalised, and to suppress radicalised individuals, in order to prevent violent or terrorist attacks. The leading principle of the Rotterdam anti-radicalisation policy was said to be the principle of “inclusion and exclusion”.

The new municipal government in power since April 2006 — lead by a coalition of the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) and the Green Left Party (Groen Links, GL) — seems to pay far less attention to ‘Islam’ as an issue in immigrant integration policies.

2.3 Recommendations
As mentioned above (see III.1 Amsterdam), Rotterdam would be a particularly good choice for inclusion in the new OSI monitoring project “Muslims in the EU: Cities Reports”, if placed in comparison with Amsterdam.

Rotterdam is commonly seen as a Dutch city that is on the front line of societal developments and tensions, which (at least in part) result from immigration and integration processes (including unemployment, socio-economic deprivation, crime and illegal housing). Already in the 1970s there were street fights between native residents and Turkish guest-workers, and in the past six years or so the problems related to illegal immigration, ghettoisation and segregation have been high on the municipal agenda. Rotterdam has also been an exemplary city for the shifts in Dutch integration discourse in the early 21st century. A study of developments in Rotterdam might discuss the merits of the new assimilationist policy approaches, which are advocated by several Dutch politicians as an alternative to “multicultural” policies.

The city of Rotterdam provides researchers with the full range of Islamic institutions and facilities, including mosques, Muslim faith-based schools and Islamic “universities”. In particular, the role of the local platform SPIOR might be an interesting focus point for a comparative study involving other European cities. The shifts in the municipal approach to Muslim organisations and facilities and the consequences thereof also provide interesting material for an in depth study. The Rotterdam municipality seems in the past decades to have tried out all possible approaches to “Islam”: a policy approach that resulted in excluding and ignoring Muslim organisations (in the late 1970s and early 1980s); an approach based on principles of inclusion and equal treatment of the Muslim population, which resulted in attempts to regulate the situation of facilities for Muslim religious practice in the city, such as mosques (in the 1990s); finally, recent policy approaches, which sought to encourage debate on Islam and in which local politicians emphasised that Muslim newcomers had to integrate and adapt to Dutch norms and values.

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The situation of Muslim communities in Rotterdam is very well documented. There are a number of studies on local policies and Muslim organisations (see, for example, Sunier, 1996; Rath et al., 2001; Canatan, 2001). Maussen (2006) gives a comprehensive overview of local policies in several domains and puts recent developments in a historical perspective. Besides these, there are several studies by the municipality itself on issues such as mosque establishment (1992, 2002; also Maussen, 2004), the societal role of mosque committees (Canatan et al., 2003) and educational activities in mosques (Pels et al., 2006).

An argument against selecting Rotterdam could be the size of the city, the government structure (including differences between city districts) and the difficulty for researchers who are not familiar with the city to give a good overview of key issues (given the size and diversity of the Muslim population). It may be advisable to combine an in depth study of one or two city districts (such as Feijenoord, or Delfshaven) with an analysis of the policies and developments at the municipal level.

Of particular interests are the districts of Feijenoord and Delfshaven:

The Feijenoord district has a total population (on 1 January 2006) of 70,662 people, of which 63.9 per cent are of immigrant origin (allochtonen). In 2001, the following estimates were made for the ethnic make-up of the population in Feijenoord district: Turks 18 per cent, Moroccans 8 per cent, Surinamese 11 per cent, Pakistani 1 per cent, and Other 1 per cent (in total, it was estimated that “Muslims” in Feijenoord comprised 29 per cent of the total population of the district). In 2002 there were nine mosques in the city district. Besides the relatively large number of Muslims in this district, there are also several studies available on different aspects of Islamic institutions in Feijenoord. These include studies on mosque establishment by Buijs 1998 and Sunier 1996 (on the Turkish Kocatepe mosque), and the recent discussions on the establishment of a Moroccan mosque (to be completed in 2007) (Maussen 2006). There is one Muslim primary school in this district.

The Delfshaven district has a total population (on 1 January 2006) of 70,290, of which 71.5 per cent are of immigrant origin (allochtonen). In 2001, the following estimates were made for the ethnic make-up of the population in Delfshaven district: Turks 14 per cent, Moroccans 12 per cent, Surinamese 14 per cent, Pakistani 1 per cent, and Other 1 per cent (in total, it was estimated that “Muslims” in Delfshaven comprised 29 per cent of the total population of the district). In 2002 there were 6 mosques in the city district, including a large Turkish purpose-built mosque, the Mevlana mosque. There are also three Muslim primary schools in this district.

103 See for these numbers the website of the municipal bureau for Research and Statistics: www.cos.rotterdam.nl
105 For the source of these numbers see footnotes above.
3. Utrecht and Zaanstad

Amsterdam and/or Rotterdam would be most relevant cities to include in the new OSI monitoring project “Muslims in the EU: Cities Project”. This section provides a shorter overview of relevant information and considerations for two smaller Dutch cities that might also be of interest: Utrecht and Zaanstad. However, if, instead, the aim is to conduct a study on the situation of Muslim communities in a medium-sized Dutch city, then other options might also be considered; for example, cities such as Tilburg, Eindhoven, Breda, Gouda and Haarlem.

3.1 Utrecht

General information

Utrecht is, with 275,000 inhabitants, one of the four major cities in the Netherlands. The Muslim population consists of about 40,000 people. In 2003, 22,609 inhabitants were of Moroccan descent, 11,939 had a Turkish background, and 9,954 had a Surinamese background. In comparison with other major cities, the number of new immigrants in Utrecht is rather low (GU, 2004: 10).

In 1981, there were five mosques in Utrecht: two Turkish mosques, two Moroccan mosques and one Surinamese mosque (Rath et al., 2001). At the end of the 1980s the number of mosques had doubled to ten. In the second half of the 1990s, several mosque organisations simultaneously developed building plans, and this has resulted in four new mosques in the city (Wessels, 2003: 76).

Besides those mosques, there are several Islamic facilities in Utrecht. In 1995, the Aboe Daoed Muslim primary school was founded. This is the only Muslim primary faith-based school in Utrecht so far. The Schools Inspectorate evaluated the school positively in a study on the contribution of Islamic schools to social cohesion. There are also facilities for Islamic funerals in Utrecht, at the Kovelswade cemetery for example. There is not yet a separate Islamic cemetery.

In comparison with cities such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague, Utrecht has suffered less from expressions of Islamic radicalism. Yet there have been a few incidents. In 2000, the imam of the Utrecht Oma al Faroek mosque was expelled from the Netherlands on suspicion of spying for the Libyan government. After the murder of Theo van Gogh turmoil arose because of the statements of an Islamic teacher who was affiliated to a mosque in Hoograven, and a terrorist suspect was arrested in Utrecht.

The municipal approach of dialogue and interaction between population groups seems to contribute to the prevention of further polarisation. In 2006, the municipality started to develop an anti-radicalisation policy. An important element of this policy is the emphasis on the improvement of social chances of immigrant young people and the promotion of dialogue in the neighbourhoods and districts.

Recommendations

106 See Islamitische scholen en sociale cohesie, Schools Inspectorate.
107 See the policy memorandum Aanpak radicalisering en terrorisme. Utrecht = van ons allemaal, dat laten we ons niet afnemen! (GU, 2006).
Although Utrecht is among the four largest cities in the Netherlands, the societal problems (in terms of unemployment, socio-economic exclusion, ethnic tensions, (illegal) immigration and housing) are not of the same magnitude as those in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. The situation of Muslim communities in Utrecht is relatively well documented. Municipal policies have been described in Rath et al. (1996) and in Maussen (2006). There is also a study on the local policy towards mosque establishment (Wessels, 2003; Landman and Wessels, 2005).

Nevertheless, in terms of academic studies and policy reports the situation of Muslim communities and Islamic institutions in Utrecht is less well documented than is the case in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In sum, Utrecht might be a good case to select because of its more “manageable” size, but simultaneously it might demand more work because fewer secondary sources are available.

3.2 Zaanstad

General information
Zaanstad has a total population of 140,000 inhabitants. There are about 10,000 inhabitants with a Turkish background and about 1,500 with a Moroccan background. At the beginning of the 1980s a Turkish mosque was founded and in 1990 a Moroccan mosque was founded in Koog aan de Zaan. By now there are five mosques in the municipality of Zaanstad. In 2001, the first Muslim primary school (De Roos) in Zaanstad opened its doors. There are facilities for Islamic funerals at the cemeteries in Krommenie and Zaandam.

At the moment there are about 40 ethnic organisations in Zaanstad that are connected in several networks and collaborate via — for example — the Platform of Turkish Organisations (PLATO) and the Federation Support for the Functions of Minorities (FSM) (Berger et al., 2001: 48). Muslim organisations are also involved in projects on integration, health care and school homework assistance. But it should be mentioned that the number of mosque organisations in Zaanstad is much smaller compared to the larger cities in the Netherlands. Besides five mosque organisations, there is an Alevi cultural association and an Islamic Turkish women’s organisation.

Zaanstad does not have an immigrant integration policy, but there is a clear policy approach on issues related to cultural diversity and integration. As far as is known Zaanstad does not have an anti-radicalisation policy either. The municipality does not seem to have the same problems as other Dutch municipalities. Yet the Office for Discrimination Affairs in Zaanstreek/Waterland has signalled an increase in extremist expressions among young people since the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. This is the case both for right-wing extremist youth and for websites that are visited by young people with a Moroccan background. By now, the Office for Discrimination Affairs has developed a couple of projects to stimulate — in cooperation with schools — democratic competences of young people, such as tolerance and mutual respect.

Recommendations
Zaanstad is a medium-sized Dutch city, with a predominantly Turkish Muslim population. The city provides an interesting case study of the ways in which immigration has caused societal issues in medium-sized Dutch cities. Moreover, the city, which is not far from

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Amsterdam, does get affected by major developments in Dutch society at large (such as ethnic tensions, right-wing extremism or anti-Muslim discourse) and by incidents that occur in other Dutch cities.

The municipal approach with regard to issues related to immigration and cultural diversity is interesting, on the one hand because it is based on the idea that ethnic organisations can function as important interlocutors for local authorities (an approach that in the 1990s was abandoned in other Dutch cities), and on the other because municipal authorities try to promote and make more visible the recent history of immigration, aiming to develop a shared sense of local identity among native or longstanding population and newcomers. 109 The situation of Muslims in Zaanstad is not so well documented (see Maussen, 2006 for a short overview).

109 See, for example, the exhibition and book “Zaankanters bestaan niet! Migratie vroeger en nu” (“Zaankanters do not exist! Migration in the past and in the present”), 2002.
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